By Juliette Oliver

Over the last two decades, Turkey has seized the opportunity for low-cost military dominance through the development of its indigenous drone and weapons programs. Turkey has risen to drone superstardom, utilizing its defense industry proactively as a hard power abroad in a quest to strengthen its place and position during global turmoil. Turkey seeks to limit reliance on Western partners and increase national independence through technological sovereignty. The rhetoric framing Ankara's exports, however, differs dramatically from conflict to conflict, such as in Russia’s war in Ukraine and in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Such shifts demonstrate an increasingly flexible, albeit complicated, drone diplomacy. Turkey uses private military companies and their drone exports to align or distance itself with buyer-states, heightening complexity around how to hold it accountable for its role in international conflicts.

BACKGROUND: 

Ankara’s inaugural test flight of the infamous Bayraktar TB2 in 2014, proved a revolutionary turning point in Turkey’s impressive indigenous military development. Since then, Turkish Armed Forces have accelerated production and pushed the bar of UAV manufacturing and supply self-sufficiency. In 2023, Turkey produced almost 80% of its own military parts and weaponry. These arms initiatives are instruments for strengthening national security, which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan underscored at a ceremony in Ankara on February 24, 2026 for Turkey’s newest addition to the autonomous weapons family, the Sancar unmanned naval vehicle. 

Conflicts such as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have become battlegrounds for drones, as well as testing sites for Erdoğan's new hard power diplomacy. Turkey has shifted its rhetoric across these conflicts, framing drone exports from purely arms trade to intense cooperation with allies. Ankara demonstrates the flexibility that drone diplomacy provides and the effort Erdoğan is willing to put in to reap maximum benefits from its engagement.

The 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War illustrates Turkey’s most direct application of drone-enabled power. At the outset of hostilities, Erdoğan declared “It’s time to pay,” backing Azerbaijan’s demands that Armenia withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh. After Azerbaijan's successful efforts to retake the territory, Erdoğan later attempted to align himself closely with the victory, claiming, “Together with our Azerbaijani brothers, we completely eliminated the enemy forces.” 

While at first praising Turkish military support, an article in Azerbaijan’s official newspaper expressed frustration at perceived Turkish exploitation of its victory, commenting, “Our people, army, and commander view with disappointment and deep sorrow the attempts to claim and take ownership of our rightful victory. Azerbaijan’s victory is for the entire Turkic world, but Türkiye is not its architect.” Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrates how Turkey uses drone exports to both shape battlefield outcomes and construct narratives of military competence and regional leadership, notwithstanding tension with allies who resent its exploitative efforts.

In stark contrast, Turkey’s approach to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reflects a more cautious and flexible strategy. Unlike most NATO members, Turkey did not impose comprehensive sanctions on Russia. It instead maintains a position of cooperative rivalry. Within this framework, Turkey has sought to position itself as a mediator while continuing defense exports to Ukraine. Turkish officials have emphasized the private, rather than governmental, nature of drone sales. Deputy Foreign Minister Yavuz Selim Kıran stated, “Kyiv purchased the drones from Baykar, a private Turkish defense company,” while then Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu asserted, “If a country buys [weapons] from us, they are no longer Turkish.” These statements aim to create distance between the state and the consequences of drone deployment despite Turkey having serious stakes in Ukraine’s successful defense against Russian aggression. Russia has rejected this framing, and the then-Russian Ambassador Alexey Yerkhov responded that “Explanations like ‘business is business’ will not work, since your drones are killing our soldiers.”

This exchange underscores the limits of plausible deniability when private firms are closely linked to national strategy and foreign policy. Although Ankara frames drone exports as private transactions, the relationship between state and industry in Turkey is deeply intertwined. Defense firms operate within a system shaped by government contracts, which are incentivized and only given to Erdoğan loyalists and those politically aligned with his regime. The prominence of Baykar, producer of the Bayraktar TB2, exemplifies this dynamic, as one of the most prolific defense companies is run by Erdoğan’s son-in-law, Selçuk Bayraktar.

This structure allows Ankara to project influence indirectly. Channeling military exports through nominally private firms enables Ankara to expand its strategic reach while limiting formal accountability. In practice, these companies function as extensions of state policy, advancing both domestic and foreign objectives.

IMPLICATIONS: 

Turkey’s rise as a drone power reflects a broader transformation in its strategic identity. Moving beyond dependence on Western suppliers, it has leveraged indigenous defense development to expand its autonomy and influence. Turkey’s hybrid drone diplomacy allows it to openly align with partners, such as with Azerbaijan in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, or maintain distance, as it has done in the case of Ukraine. Across both contexts, drones enable a form of indirect power projection that blends military effectiveness with strategic narrative-building. 

Other countries have already taken notice, and have either condemned the spread of Turkish drones to their neighborhood or embraced the opportunity to bolster their respective capabilities. In February 2026, the Turkish arms supplier Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKE) signed a major export agreement with the Egyptian Ministry of Defense for $350 million, which includes the sale of ammunition and joint procurement of drones. Israel was quick to denounce such agreements, believing these developments signal efforts not only to seek reconciliation with former regional rivals, but to create a coordinated political and strategic bloc described as a “Sunni ring” militarily surrounding Israel. The extensive efforts that Turkey is making to compartmentalize its private military and public governmental sphere provide it with a back door and leave other countries struggling with how to respond. Israel for instance has opted for a strategy of challenging Turkey’s trade in the region with its own and through containment.

These occurrences will only increase as Turkey pushes full steam ahead to capitalize on its drone diplomacy as a means for normalization with other countries. It will become increasingly more difficult to hold Turkey accountable for its arms exports as these systems and relationships expand. Turkey's evolving and increasingly active posture in regional military affairs motivates countries in the West, including the United States, to develop their military industries and compete on the global stage. Recognizing that the future of domestic securitization will progressively be ensured by autonomous weaponry, the U.S. will be forced to compete with -- rather than solely confront -- Turkey, which in the past was the initial reason for development of autonomous weapons.

CONCLUSION: 

Turkey’s drone diplomacy reveals not just a shift in military capability, but a recalibration of how power is projected while diffusing accountability. By leveraging nominally private defense firms to advance strategic objectives, Ankara has constructed a flexible model of influence that adapts across conflicts while complicating international responses.

Turkey’s approach offers a template for indirect, deniable power projection in contemporary warfare. This in turn incites other countries to refine their own diplomatic framework in parallel with the foreign drone market in order to keep pace with and adapt to the contemporary era of drone diplomacy.

AUTHOR'S BIO: 

Juliette Oliver is a researcher with the American Foreign Policy Council and is pursuing her master’s degree in Eurasian studies.