Fehim Işık on the news site Haberdar writes that political Islam, represented by AKP and Erdoğan has succeeded in bringing Kemalist nationalism, represented by Baykal (the former CHP leader) and the Turkic nationalism of MHP together on the shared ground of enmity against the Kurds. And by pulling the army fully to his side, Erdoğan is aiming to make his power eternal. Can he do it? I don’t belong to those who believe that the Kemalist forces of the status quo, sustained by the army, are ever going to offer that opportunity to Erdoğan. That is so because the military and the defenders of status quo are not only against the Kurds but also against the pious. At one point, this alliance is going to end, and it is the Erdoğan side of it that is set to sustain the heavy blow. The military is not going to switch allegiance. It is possible to predict that Kemalist nationalism and Turkic racism are going to be the winners.
Ahmet Altan on the news site Haberdar writes that the army and AKP are working in tandem. Maybe the army is seeking to obtain what it has been trying to do for years by mobilizing the AKP – with its vast majority – behind it. This could be a dream come true for the army, that it now thanks to AKP and its majority can crush the Kurds, the leftists and the religious conservatives outside of AKP so handily. And it could be that AKP is thinking that it makes sense to cooperate with the army in order to force the Kurds to accept a presidential system, to silence its opponents, and wipe out the other religious conservatives from the field. But beware, while cooperating, you run the risk of turning into the force with which you cooperate. While the AKP is turning into an image of the old state, the military is becoming more like the AKP. The daily Cumhuriyet has recently exposed how the army is collaborating with ISIS at the Syrian border. The conservative base of the AKP will not long take the “militarization” of the party; in fact, that is one of the reasons behind the internal fissures that are slowly becoming visible. Meanwhile, the attempt to turn the army into an AKP army could have truly disastrous consequences in terms of the internal cohesion of the military. The Turkish army could split like the Lebanese army.
Oral Çalışlar in Radikal writes that the taking over of the daily Zaman seals the defeat of the Gülen movement. Fethullah Gülen had pushed the button for the arrest of Erdoğan and for the takeover of power. Tayyip Erdoğan did not cave in, he responded by rallying society behind himself. Still, the fraternity refused to concede defeat. They attempted to pursue their power contest with Erdoğan by aligning with other forces of opposition. Now, we are at the point where the “game is over.” This was a political struggle. The fraternity had chosen the path of illegitimate struggle, using the “structure” that it had built up within the state. The resources within the judiciary and the police were used to threaten and to blackmail. And the measures that the government took against them in defense further impaired the judiciary. Did the Gülenists ever stand a chance to win? Had Fethullah hodja planned to return to Turkey and assume power like another Khomeini? Could something like this ever have succeeded? No, Turkey is not a kind of a society where such a project could have worked. And now there is no way back from the defeat that has destroyed the Gülen movement.
Ergun Babahan on the news site Özgür Düşünce writes that AKP’s antagonistic policies against Muslims and Kurds are at a par with the oppression that has historically been associated with CHP, the founding party of the republic. In fact what is happening can be viewed as “mopping up” actions by the state which uses the AKP as its tool. The Kurds and the Gülen movement are seen as enemies by the state. AKP are doing the bidding of the state by terrorizing girls in headscarf and by being the standard-bearer of the policy of extermination against the Kurds. But make no mistake, for the state the AKP is nothing but a tissue that is used and which will be discarded when it’s no longer needed. In the 1990’s, the military had had to pay for what was done against Kurds and Muslims, and this was what paved the way for the ascent of AKP to power. This time, it will not be the military, but the president, the prime minister and the other AKP leaders who are going to be held responsible for the breaches of law and the violations of human rights. What we are witnessing in Şırnak, Cizre and Sur shows that the state has decided to destroy the Kurdish cities and empty them of their inhabitants. This is the 1915 model adapted to the conditions of our time, and it could set off an exodus of Turkey’s Kurds toward Europe.
Cengiz Çandar in Radikal writes that Turkey is seeking a closer relation with the EU because the historical rivalry between it and Russia has been revived, with Turkey being encircled on three fronts by a Russia that has annexed Crimea to the north, has strengthened its military ties with Armenia to the east and has become entrenched to the south by its support to the Kurds in the vicinity of Aleppo and has denied Turkey access to the north Syrian air space. In this context, Ankara (which does not mean exclusively the AKP government) views the PKK as an “asset” that Russia is using or will use against Turkey. The Turkey-EU “refugee bargaining” becomes intelligible by looking at this big picture. Turkey, which is “besieged” by Russia and feels to under “strategic threat” is reorienting in the direction that remains open for it, that is to the West, across the Aegean Sea. At the same time, Ankara is exploring a “common ground” with Iran in countering the Kurds, just like Turkey did back in 1937, when the Saadabad treaty was concluded with Persia. This “political maneuver” by Turkey is also an attempt to break the Russia-Iran entente over Syria.
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.