By Barçın Yinanç

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s claim that Israel poses a threat and might even attack Turkey lacks credibility. On the contrary, Turkish and Israeli strategic interests converge. Turkey and Iran have long been at odds in Syria, Iraq as well as in the south Caucasus and Turkey may welcome the degradation of Iranian power in the Middle East. Yet Ankara must also reckon with the risks of an all-out war between Israel and Iran for Turkish interests. Its military presence in Syria and Iraq exposes Turkey to the risk of being directly affected by the conflagration. Ultimately, the unknown consequences of a wider regional war and its spillover effects could outweigh the benefit for Turkey that a weakened Iran would represent. 

BACKGROUND:  Addressing the opening session of the Turkish parliament on October 1, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu is acting out his dream of a "promised land" for Israel and that the Jewish state harbors designs on Turkish territory. "After Lebanon, the next place on which Israel will set its eyes will be our homeland," Erdoğan asserted. The opposition asked for information that sustains the claim: “If there is a threat from Israel, we would like to know about it,” said Özgür Özel, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). On October 8, the Turkish parliament held a closed session during which the foreign and defense ministers briefed the lawmakers on the security risks that the wars in Gaza and Lebanon represent. Speaking after the closed session, opposition leader Özgür Özel commented that he had not been convinced about the existence of a purported Israeli threat against Turkey. “We did not hear anything that we did not already know,” he said. The conflagration in the Middle East provides Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) with an opportunity to consolidate its constituency and mobilize the public. Conjuring an alleged Israeli threat and calling a closed session of the parliament serves to instill a sense of emergency and insecurity among the population. Yet what ultimately amounts to an attempt to divert attention from the dire state of the economy backfired: the announcement of the government – directly after the closed session of the parliament – that new taxes were going to be imposed to boost the national defense industry caused a public backlash and the proposal had to be withdrawn. Nonetheless, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has continued to raise alarm, warning about the risk not only of a wider regional war but also of a Third World War. Although national security issues and the specter of war are clearly exploited for domestic political purposes, with the government hoping to divert public attention from more immediate economic worries, Ankara nevertheless also remains seriously concerned about the fallouts of the escalating conflict between Israel and Iran.

IMPLICATIONS: Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize the Jewish state, and even though the Palestinian problem historically has been a strain on bilateral relations, Turkish and Israeli national security interests in fact converge. It was only after the peace process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the early 1990s that Turkish-Israeli bilateral ties were significantly developed but public appearances can be misleading: While Turkey is less vocal about Iran – a neighbor with which its geopolitical rivalry dates to the sixteenth century – than it is about Israel, which it pretends is an enemy but with which it shares strategic interests, Turkey and Iran have clashing interests across the Middle East and beyond. Israel appears determined to inflict huge damage to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and by extension to its patron Iran. This strategy may very well be seen as serving Ankara’s interests, at least in the short term. Turkey and Iran have long been at odds in Syria, Iraq as well as in the south Caucasus. In this light, the degradation of Iranian power in the Middle East is in Turkey’s interest. Indeed, when the Islamist uprising started in Syria 2011, the Turkish AKP government sought to topple Syrian leader Bashar Al-Assad, whose regime survived only thanks to the active support of Russia and Iran. Today, Turkish military units as well as Turkish-backed Islamist groups stand pitted against Iran-backed militias in northwestern Syria. Under normal circumstances, Israel’s airstrikes against Hezbollah positions in Syria, as well as its attack on Iran’s consulate in Damascus last April would hardly have displeased Ankara. Yet Ankara must also reckon with the risks that an all-out war between Israel and Iran inevitably would pose for Turkish interests. Ultimately, the unknown consequences of such a war and its spillover effects could outweigh the benefit for Turkey that a weakened Iran would represent.  But domestic political considerations are no less pressing. Erdoğan and his ruling AKP must contend with the widespread popular discontent with the nearly four million Syrian refugees in Turkey; this discontent, which has already cost the AKP votes in recent elections, compels Erdoğan to mend fences with Al-Assad who, however, has been less than willing to accommodate Turkey. The quadrilateral talks between Russia, Iran, Turkey and Syria have been inconclusive as Damascus’ precondition – the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syrian territory – is a nonstarter for Ankara. Ultimately though, Al-Assad may become more open to reconciliation with Erdoğan as Israel’s onslaught demolishes Hezbollah and degrades the Iranian power that he has relied on. Israel’s next step in its clash with Iran could also have implications in Iraq, where Tehran has acquired considerable political clout after the 2003 U.S. invasion empowered the Shiite majority. Turkey views Iran as a destabilizing actor in Iraq and tries to counterbalance its influence. Iran backs one of the Kurdish rival factions, the Kurdistan Patriotic Union (PUK) which retains close ties with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that has waged a now four decades long insurgency against Ankara. As the PKK’s freedom of movement has increased in the area under the PUK control, tensions have intensified between Turkey and Iran. Meanwhile, the relationship between Tehran and Baghdad is far from being a simple agent-proxy arrangement. Last August, Iraq signed a memorandum of understanding on military, security and counter-terrorism cooperation with Turkey, raising Iranian concerns about Ankara’s increasing military influence in Iraq. Turkey has established military bases and posts in northern Iraq, and the rapprochement between Turkey and Iraq attests to Baghdad’s effort to consolidate its relative stability as well as its independence from Tehran. Also economic schemes like the Development Road Project, a proposed trade network that will link Iraq to Turkey serves this purpose. For its part, Ankara wants to use the project as an incentive to secure Baghdad’s cooperation against the PKK while the Iranian-backed PUK has expressed its opposition to the Development Road Project, questioning its benefits for the Kurdish region of Iraq. But as Iran is preoccupied with Israel’s offensive, its ability to maneuver in Iraq may become constrained, increasing the capability of the central government in Baghdad to exert power over its territory. In such a scenario, the Iranian-backed Kurdish PUK might be compelled to sever its ties with the PKK. Yet while the degradation of Iranian power would thus translate into gains for Turkey in Iraq, the security situation in Iraq is also of growing concern for Ankara. Although the Iraqi front has remained relatively quiet since October 7, 2023, there are signs that this might be about to change. Iran-backed Iraqi militias have now claimed responsibility for nearly 170 attacks on Israeli targets this past year, of which more than 70 percent took place in September 2024 alone. The escalation may bring about the targeting of U.S. forces that are based mainly in areas under the control of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). U.S. assets in both Syria and Iraq have already been targeted. The spillover to Iraq threatens to disrupt the relative yet fragile stability of the country to the detriment of Turkish interests.

CONCLUSIONS:  President Erdoğan’s claim that Israel poses a threat and might even attack Turkey lacks credibility. It is a transparent attempt by the AKP government to divert public attention from the country’s dire economic situation. In fact, Turkish and Israeli strategic interests converge. Turkey and Iran have long been at odds in Syria, Iraq as well as in the south Caucasus and Turkey may thus welcome the degradation of Iranian power in the Middle East.  Yet Ankara must also reckon with the risks that an all-out war between Israel and Iran would inevitably pose for Turkish interests. With its military presence in Syria and Iraq Turkey is at risk of being affected and possibly even drawn into the conflagration in the Middle East. Ultimately, the unknown consequences of a wider regional war and its spillover effects could outweigh the benefit for Turkey that a weakened Iran would represent. 

Barçın Yinanç is a foreign policy commentator at the Turkish news site t24 

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