By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 4, no. 16 of the Turkey Analyst)
Attacks carried out by Kurdish separatists since mid-July have set Turkey on the road to war. The Turkish government is determined to exact a heavy price from the Kurdish insurgents, and the PKK militants seem to be as determined to provoke an ethnic conflagration. As he is about to teach the Kurdish insurgents a severe lesson, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan faces what could be the greatest challenge of his career. The question is if the unparalleled power and authority that Erdoğan has assembled will ultimately suffice to secure Turkey’s unity.
By Gareth H. Jenkins (vol. 4, no. 13 of the Turkey Analyst)
In the general election of June 12, 2011, candidates backed by the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) won 36 seats in Turkey’s 550-member unicameral parliament. On June 21, 2011, the Supreme Electoral Board (YSK) stripped Hatip Dicle, one of the successful BDP candidates, of his seat on procedural grounds. On June 23, the BDP announced that it would boycott parliament unless Dicle was reinstated. Over the days that followed, courts in the city of Diyarbakır blocked the release of another five successful BDP candidates. The decisions infuriated the BDP and further antagonized Turkey’s already deeply alienated Kurdish minority. Unless the Turkish government acts quickly, both the BDP’s civil disobedience campaign and the violent insurgency of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) appear likely to escalate; with potentially devastating repercussions for Turkey’s social and political stability.
By Gareth H. Jenkins (vol. 4, no. 5 of the Turkey Analyst)
On February 28, 2011, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced that it was abrogating its unilateral ceasefire first declared on August 13, 2010. Initially, the PKK had been expected to continue to abstain from violence until after the June 12, 2011 general election; after which Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has pledged to introduce a new, more liberal, constitution. However, recent months have witnessed growing frustration at the AKP’s refusal to clarify what concessions to Kurdish demands will be included in the new constitution; while a large number of Kurdish nationalists have been arrested and prosecuted on poorly substantiated charges.
By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 3, no. 9 of the Turkey Analyst)
The interests of the Islamic conservatives and the Kurds converged when both challenged the authority of the Turkish state. Today, however, the ruling Justice and development party (AKP) has little incentive to act differently toward the Kurds than its republican predecessors. And the Kurdish Peace and democracy party (BDP) has concluded that the cause of the Kurdish movement will not be advanced by supporting the AKP’s bid to tailor the constitution after its own needs.
By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 3, no. 2 of the Turkey Analyst)
The Turkish military no longer commands the obedience of society. However, the demilitarization of the Turkish polity is not ushering in a reversal of the traditional state-society relationship. The omnipotence of the state is not in any basic sense challenged. The AKP seeks not so much to dismantle the absolute state authority that the military has embodied, as it strives to become its new embodiment.
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.