By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 4, no. 4 of the Turkey Analyst)
In the deeply polarized climate that pervades Turkish society, it has become near-impossible to stake out an ideological terrain that would enable the country to come to terms with an authoritarianism that is in fact a generalized phenomenon haunting the country. There is a compulsion to take sides either for the AKP or for the generals, who are convicted or acquitted depending on political preferences. Liberal values, on the other hand, risk being sacrificed as Turkey neglects to take a comprehensive look at its authoritarian past and present.
By Halil M. Karaveli and Svante E. Cornell (vol. 4, no. 3 of the Turkey Analyst)
Turkey’s leaders have embraced the popular revolts in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries, with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül publicly urging Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to respect the will of the people and resign. Yet where authoritarian regimes are Islamic as in Iran and Sudan, Ankara has propped them up and refrained from any criticism; only where Islamists are in opposition has the Turkish government come out in support of change to the status quo and “democracy”. In fact, the AKP foreign policy is in ever clearer terms motivated primarily by Islamic solidarity and ideology. Contrary to expectations that Turkey will serve as a moderate example to emulate for the forces that clamor for change in the Middle East, the convulsions in the Arab world risk giving further impetus to Islamic radicalization in Turkey itself.
By Gareth H. Jenkins (vol. 4, no. 3 of the Turkey Analyst)
A package of judicial reforms recently submitted to parliament by Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) proposes a radical overhaul of the country’s appeal processes. The AKP’s supporters claim that the changes will transform Turkey’s overburdened and largely dysfunctional legal system. The government’s opponents maintain that they represent an attempt by the AKP to pack the court system with its own appointees and destroy the last vestiges of judicial independence.
By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 4, no. 2 of the Turkey Analyst)
The liberals who were instrumental in legitimating the ascension of the Justice and development party (AKP) are now dramatically revoking their support for the Islamic conservatives. Its erstwhile allies accuse the AKP of seeking to reintroduce a culturally conservative version of the old regime of state tutelage. Yet it is simply beyond the power of the state to impose an ideological straitjacket on Turkey, be it Kemalist or Islamist.
By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 4, no. 1 of the Turkey Analyst)
The ruling Justice and development party (AKP) seems to have recommitted itself to keeping Turkey a mono-culturally Turkish state. Recent appearances are nonetheless deceptive. The AKP is not ideologically beholden to Turkish nationalism in the old, Kemalist mould. Turkey’s ruling party is nevertheless heir to a state tradition which precludes societal participation and democratic deliberation. The Kurds are expected to remain quiescent and await the state to eventually extend its benevolence, while the Turks are being misled by a nationalist discourse that veils the changes that follow from the state’s Kurdish opening.
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.