By Richard Weitz (vol. 5, no. 8 of the Turkey Analyst)

Despite its challenging neighborhood, Turkey has an exemplary nuclear nonproliferation record. Several favorable factors have allowed Turkey to abstain from developing its own nuclear weapons and make strong declarations in favor of nuclear nonproliferation. Having physical access to the U.S.-NATO nuclear weapons has been a form of compensation for Turkey’s not developing its own national nuclear arsenal. Even so, while Turkey can boast a largely successful nuclear nonproliferation record, certain plausible developments could still undermine it and force a reluctant Ankara to seek its own nuclear arsenal.

By M. K. Kaya (vol. 5, no. 2 of the Turkey Analyst) 

By agreeing to deploy the Army Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance System (AN/TPY-2) on Turkish soil, the United States and Turkey have concluded by far the strategically most significant agreement in many years. By hosting the radar, Turkey has dispelled doubts regarding its alliance allegiances, while concurrently making itself a target of Iranian counter-measures. The crucial question for Turkey in the wake of the deployment in Malatya is the extent to which NATO’s missile defense shield will indeed provide it with comprehensive protection. Whether or not the possible security gains stand to be offset by new security threats arising is the vital question that begs for an answer, and that the Turkish authorities need to address.

By Richard Weitz (vol. 3, no. 16 of the Turkey Analyst)

The drawing down of the U.S. military presence in Iraq is set to remove a source of tension between Turkey and the United States. The two military establishments, whose longstanding ties have been strained by diverging changes in U.S. and Turkish national security policies in recent years, are eager to avoid further public confrontations. But since the Turkish government has begun exploring new partnerships with former adversaries, Washington policy makers should not have excessive confidence regarding U.S. leverage in Ankara, despite the continuing close ties between their two military establishments.

By Richard Weitz (vol. 3, no. 9 of the Turkey Analyst)

Turkey has presented a unique challenge to the efforts of NATO and the EU to restructure their roles, missions, and capabilities to address Europe’s 21st-century security challenges.  It is impossible to construct an effective European security architecture without addressing Turkey’s role. Yet, finding an appropriate place for Ankara in the evolving EU-NATO balance has proven exceptionally difficult given the country’s continued exclusion from the EU and the dispute between Turkey and the government of Cyprus. Turkish officials have waged a protracted battle to secure some influence on EU security decisions as well as to compel Greek Cypriots to reach a political settlement with their Turkish minority. In pursuit of these ends, they have proved willing to block EU-NATO cooperation on important security issues.

By M. K. Kaya and Svante E. Cornell (vol. 1, no. 12 of the Turkey Analyst)

Like most other states, Turkey was hard pressed to respond to the war in Georgia. For Turkey, the war threatened its position in the Caucasus, as well as its long-term objective of becoming a hub of European energy transportation. Prime Minister Erdogan chose to moment in order to promote a form of Caucasian alliance - a well-intentioned but somewhat surreal proposal in the middle of a raging war. The crisis exposed the government's lack of attention to the Caucasus, and the need for a serious rethink of Turkey's role there