By: Michael Tanchum

The strategic partnership between Turkey and Azerbaijan is experiencing its most severe strain since Ankara and Baku signed their strategic partnership agreement in 2010. The tensions have been unprecedented, both in their public nature and the vehemence of the recriminations that Baku has expressed toward Ankara. Erupting over the course of October 2026 ostensibly as a ‘spat’ over Azerbaijan’s ban on hijabs in public schools, Baku has viewed the matter as reflecting a wider disregard for Azerbaijani sovereignty in its domestic affairs and its autonomy in foreign affairs. The matter has serious implications for Turkey’s strategic interests in the Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) as Azerbaijan forms the geographic link between Turkey and the Central Asian republics. The growing strength and increasing depth of Azerbaijan’s international partnerships will require Ankara to conduct its own relationship with Baku with greater parity.

 

File:Turkish President Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in  Baku.jpg - Wikimedia Commons

 

BACKGROUND:  

On September 21, 2026, the Azerbaijani government amended its regulations concerning school uniforms in public schools to prohibit "additional elements of clothing that violate the uniform requirements for school uniforms and contradict the principle of secular education." The amended regulations were in accordance with the Azerbaijani constitution, which proclaims the secular nature of the state, with Article 18 explicitly affirming the secular nature of public education. Although no specific elements of clothing were listed in the amended regulations, public complaints began emerging in early October that some schools were barring female students and teachers wearing hijabs (traditional Muslim headscarf) from entering schools. Protests by affected students and their families were joined by teachers, religious leaders, and other public figures. When protestors started damaging the schools and the property of school administrators, the government stepped in to restore order and filed criminal cases against the protesters.

 

Several officials of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) criticized the Azerbaijani public school dress code banning hijabs. Foremost among these was Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s advisor Oktay Saral who publicly posted on social media on October 12: “Leaving a student who covers her head for reasons of faith at the school gate – how can this fit into any conscience, any sense of justice?” Ankara was taken aback by the vehemence of the official Azerbaijani reaction.

 

The ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party described criticism from Saral and AKP parliament members as “systematic and openly slanderous” and “populist and irresponsible statements without taking account of the issue.”  The statement from Azerbaijan’s ruling party also declared the statements by Saral and other officials “contradict the spirit of Azerbaijani-Turkish fraternal relations and can serve to create artificial tensions at the societal level.”  AKP-affiliated organizations have an outsized presence in Azerbaijani social media, leading to longtime concerns among some analysts within the wider Azerbaijani policy community to be concerned about Ankara undermining Azerbaijani sovereignty through popular mobilization.  

 

The public crisis revealed deeper structural tensions in Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship, which for decades has been touted from both sides with the slogan “One nation, two states.” On October 19, Azerbaijan issued arrest warrants in absentia for seven social media influencers and internet journalists operating in Turkey and placing the seven accused on an international wanted list. The Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan, according to Azerbaijani media reports,  claimed that the accused “used social media and internet platforms to disseminate materials calling for the violent overthrow of the constitutional order and the seizure of state power in Azerbaijan, as well as violence, incitement of religious hatred, and enmity based on religious radicalism.”

 

IMPLICATIONS:

The strategic partnership between Turkey and Azerbaijan is experiencing its most severe strain since Ankara and Baku signed their strategic partnership agreement in 2010. That agreement catalyzed the construction of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the Baku-Tblisi-Kars (BTK) railway and other key infrastructure projects during the 2010s that serve as the foundation of the Middle Corridor – a commercial trade route connecting China and Central Asia to Europe via Azerbaijan and Turkey. For Azerbaijan, the corridor’s construction was essential for creating international stakeholder interest in the preservation of Azerbaijani sovereignty in the face of threats from the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. It also bolstered Azerbaijan’s international clout as Baku sought to regain the Karabakh territory it had lost to Armenia.  Ankara and Baku concomitantly deepened their defense relationship during the 2010s, which eventually saw Azerbaijan recover its territories through a 2020 military victory over Armenia, enabled by an unprecedented level of Turkish military assistance.

 

For Turkey, its economic and defense relationship with Azerbaijan formed a strategic linchpin of the country’s post-Cold War geopolitical ambitions under the two and half decade rule of the AKP. In moving beyond Turkey’s Cold War framework, President Erdoğan has been guided for over two decades by the strategic goal of transforming Turkey into an interregional power that will set the terms for a new pattern of connectivity between Europe, Africa and Asia. Ankara and Baku’s construction of the Middle Corridor’s Turkey-to-Azerbaijan link and the 2020 military victory over Armenia changed the rules of the game in the South Caucasus, upending the geopolitics of Europe-to-Central Asia and China commerce and resulting in the elevation of  Turkey from a transit state to one of the principal agenda-setters of Eurasian connectivity. 

 

In 2021, following the military victory, Ankara restructured the Turkey-led Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, renaming it the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).  As the first among the Turkic nations to be an independent state in the modern era, Turkey considers itself as the ‘elder brother’ of the other Turkic nations which achieved their independence in the 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the largest population and largest army, Turkey also views itself as the natural leader of the OTS. The Erdoğan government seeks to mold the organization into an international bloc after its own image and policy orientation.  In 2022, Ankara secured the admission of the internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of North Cyprus as an observer member in 2022. In 2023 Erdoğan declared at the OTS Summit, “We will work shoulder to shoulder to make the coming period the era of the Turks by extending our vision [emphasis added] of the ‘Turkish Century’ to the Organization of Turkic States.” 

 

In 2025, the Turkish Ministry of Education officially replaced the term “Central Asia” with the term “Turkestan” across its entire educational curriculum. The change reflects President Erdoğan’s "Century of Türkiye" vision, which he reiterated in his October 29, 2025 speech marking the 102nd anniversary of the founding of the Turkish Republic  – a vision of Turkish international leadership that Erdoğan explicitly seeks to extend to the OTS with the ambition to influence the societies of Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics to conform with religio-social norms the AKP.  One year later, the AKP’s overreach into Azerbaijani domestic and foreign affairs resulted in President Aliyev refusing to attend the October 29-30 Organization of Turkic States (OTS) summit in Ankara.

 

Ankara needs to recognize that after the 2020 Karabakh War Turkey no longer can treat Baku as the ‘little brother’ in their strategic relationship, despite Turkey’s significant military assistance in helping Azerbaijan to secure its victory. Baku also received critical military assistance from Israel during the war and the continuation of the robust Azerbaijani-Israeli strategic partnership, including Azerbaijan’s incorporation into a wider Abraham Accords framework, provides Baku with another policy tool to preserve its strategic autonomy.

 

Moreover, Azerbaijan’s recovery of its territory has increased Baku’s geopolitical clout, transforming how Azerbaijan pursues its national interests through a multi-vectored foreign policy. Azerbaijan is pursuing peace with Armenia with Washington’s involvement, enhancing Baku’s position vis-à-vis Moscow as Russia continues to be consumed with its war in Ukraine. Baku also perceives Beijing to have a deepening stake in Azerbaijani sovereignty, a perception supported by growing Sino-Azerbaijani cooperation in developing the logistics of the Middle Corridor. As tensions with Turkey unfolded, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Baku on October 14.  

 

CONCLUSIONS:

The current strain between Ankara and Baku reveals an underlying structural tension in the strategic partnership between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and symbolic gestures from Ankara won’t smooth over the breach. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev made the stakes clear by his refusal to personally attend the OTS summit in Ankara in October. Even though Erdoğan forced his advisor Oktay Saral to resign four days before the summit, Aliyev still refused to attend.  The immediate public aspect of the crisis was defused with Erdoğan’s November 8 visit to Azerbaijan for Victory Day, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Aliyev in Shusha, whose capture marks Azerbaijan’s victory in the Karabakh War.  

 

While the two presidents praised the Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership and affirmed its enduring nature, Ankara will need to recalibrate its approach to Baku. A telling sign of this new reality came on the next day, November 9, 2026 – not in Shusha, but in Shanghai – when the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) signed a Memorandum of Understanding on strategic cooperation with Chinese state oil and chemical giant Sinopec. The growing strength and increasing depth of Azerbaijan’s international partnerships will require Ankara to conduct its own relationship with Baku with greater parity.

 

Authors Bio:

Dr. Michael Tanchum is an associate fellow in the Economics and Energy at the Middle East Institute (MEI) in Washington, D.C.  He is also a Senior Associate Fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Studies (AIES) and an affiliated scholar of the Centre for Strategic Policy Implementation at Başkent Universty in Ankara, Turkey (Başkent-SAM). Follow @michaeltanchum. The author would like to thank Tal Rozenblit for his research assistance. 

 

By: Halil Karaveli

The peace process between the PKK and the Turkish state has imposed neutrality on the Kurdish political movement that for the past decade had invested in the opposition. Presumably, the Kurdish movement recognizes that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won’t accommodate its demands for Turkish-Kurdish equality. Yet the Kurds are nonetheless compelled to rely on Erdoğan’s goodwill. The founder of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan is at an impasse. To have any chance of achieving his professed objective -- a democratic, bi-national republic of Turkey – Öcalan will need to forge an alliance with Turkish progressives who distrust and shun him, and the agreement between him and Erdoğan has only made this harder.

 

shutterstock 1923540713

 

BACKGROUND:

On August 10, the Turkish parliament with a vast majority passed a bill providing limited amnesty for demobilized militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). While 468 lawmakers voted yes, only 88 voted no. 54 of those who rejected the bill hailed from the main opposition New Party – a majority of the party group -- and 29 from the nationalist opposition Good Party.

After waging an insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984, the PKK announced it was formally dissolving last year, following an order from its imprisoned founder Abdullah Öcalan. Öcalan, who won’t be included in the amnesty, praised the bill as heralding a process of democratization that is “as significant as the founding of the (Turkish) republic.” Meanwhile, the speaker of the Turkish parliament Numan Kurtulmuş proclaimed the end of Turkey’s longtime Kurdish issue and claimed that the “liquidation of the terrorist organization” and the amnesty bill presage unity and solidarity in Turkey. Others though were less cheerful.

There’s widespread suspicion in opposition circles that Öcalan, as part of the deal, has secretly agreed to endorse the reelection of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, an allegation that the representatives of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey have denied. And while the amnesty deal predictably drew the ire of die-hard Turkish nationalists, it has also brought to the surface the Turkish nationalism that animates much of the Turkish left, with the leader of the center-left New Party Özgür Özel, who voted yes to the bill, failing to sway the majority of his own party group.

Historically, reconciling leftist class politics and Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms has proved impossible, even though the Kurdish movement was initially part of the broader left in Turkey in the 1960s. But Turkish Marxists demanded that their Kurdish allies prioritize the class struggle and postpone the realization of their ethnic aspirations until the advent of socialism. Öcalan broke ranks with them and in 1978 launched an exclusively Kurdish revolutionary struggle for an independent and socialist Kurdistan, but he abandoned orthodox Marxism-Leninism after his imprisonment in 1999. In a message to the International Conference for Peace and Democratic Society in Istanbul last December, Öcalan called for “reclaiming socialism through peace and building a democratic society,” arguing that “actual existing socialism” has been a failure because it was “nothing but a reproduction of statist mentality.” Instead, “today the time has come to advance toward democratic emancipation on the basis of democratic society socialism,” Öcalan opined.

Yet it’s questionable that the specter of “democratic society socialism” stands any realistic chance of mobilizing wider support. It’s not only that leftist ideals enjoy scant appeal in Turkish society. Öcalan is hardly taken seriously at all by Turkish progressives – the left-wing Kurdish movement’s prospective allies -- who are convinced that Öcalan has now become an Erdoğan ally. Duran Kalkan, a member of the PKK leadership, lamented that the left and other democrats haven’t done enough to break the hold of “chauvinistic nationalism” and to mobilize societal support for peace. At best though, Öcalan’s motives and objectives are difficult to divine, and some statements attributed to him seemingly contradict his avowed objective of building grass-roots democracy. They intimate instead that the Kurdish leader privileges a top-down approach and seeks to forge an alliance with the repressive Turkish state. 

Öcalan has on several occasions during the past decades hailed the accord in the 16th century between the Ottoman sultanate and Kurdish tribal leaders that secured Kurdish autonomy and helped tip the geopolitical balance in favor of the Ottomans and against Persia. Recent comments by him in the same vein have reinforced the perception that he has in mind a similar, mutually beneficial accord with the Turkish state today. Öcalan has also reportedly professed that the Kurdish movement will become “a pillar of the state, just like the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) is.”

The cadres of the far-right MHP are entrenched in the state security apparatus and the leader of the MHP Devlet Bahçeli has been the main driver of the reconciliation process with the PKK. Counter-intuitively, the far right nationalist leader – who as deputy prime minister a quarter century ago insisted that Öcalan be executed -- and the Kurdish rebel leader have formed an unlikely political partnership. On October 10, Bahçeli reiterated his call that Öcalan be endowed with official status and appointed “coordinator” of the repatriation of process of the demobilized PKK militants.

IMPLICATIONS:

The fact that the founder of the PKK consented to disarm and dissolve the PKK without any prior agreement with Turkey has remained a source of speculation and has driven uncertainty about the current political process. When peace talks were held between 2013 and 2015, Öcalan refused to tell the PKK to lay down its weapons without a formal agreement with Turkey, saying “really, how do you drop armed struggle without an agreement? All over the world, in these sorts of conflicts, weapons are the last thing that gets dropped.” 

Why, a decade later, has Öcalan seemed to abandon this condition? Öcalan always knew that without the threat of war there was little reason for Turkey to pay attention to the Kurdish cause. Ultimately, though, he was compelled to reverse course because the PKK had hit an impasse. The armed struggle had been faltering for years and could not match superior Turkish military technology. 

Nonetheless, Öcalan is adamant that the dissolution of the PKK and the end of the armed struggle don’t amount to any capitulation. In a message to the Peace and Democratic Integration conference in London on September 29, Öcalan insisted that the Kurdish movement hasn’t surrendered and enumerated the core Kurdish demands: constitutional guarantees for the Kurdish language, culture and identity, local self-rule and the creation of conditions that will enable the participants in the armed struggle to assume responsibilities in democratic politics.

Reasonably, Öcalan recognizes that the regime of Erdoğan, which has cracked down on the Turkish main opposition and still keeps Kurdish politicians incarcerated, will not devolve power to the Kurds or countenance activism, however peaceful, for Kurdish rights and democratic reforms. But ultimately that may not matter to Öcalan who has developed an alternative strategy that seeks to operate outside of repressive state institutions. The rebel leader has earlier argued that the Kurds needed to grab power locally, create democratic institutions from the bottom up. Presumably, Öcalan views the militants who will now return home following the amnesty bill as the avant-garde of this people’s emancipation.

On the face of it, this strategy of democratic emancipation from below can’t be squared with what looks like an ambition to forge an alliance with the repressive Turkish state. But endeavoring to become a “pillar of the state” doesn’t necessarily imply that Kurdish democratic demands will be surrendered and that the Kurdish political movement will join the alliance that upholds the Erdoğan regime, as the Turkish opposition assumes it already has. It makes more sense to view Öcalan’s words about becoming a pillar of the state in light of his objective to reinvent Turkey as a state that belongs to the Kurds as much as to the Turks. Yet this still leaves the question of how the aspirations of the Kurdish political movement will be advanced unresolved.

CONCLUSION: 

For the past decade, the Kurdish political movement in Turkey invested in the opposition, boosting the fortunes of the once presidential hopeful Ekrem İmamoğlu, who was elected mayor of Istanbul in 2019 and reelected in 2024 with crucial Kurdish support. The support of the Kurds also helped the main opposition party carry the local elections nationwide in 2024. That alliance now belongs to the past. The peace process between the Turkish state and the PKK has imposed neutrality on a Kurdish leadership that can ill afford to antagonize Erdoğan.

Presumably, the Kurdish movement recognizes that Erdoğan won’t accommodate its demands for Turkish-Kurdish equality. Yet the Kurds are nonetheless compelled to rely on Erdoğan’s goodwill. The opposition has no realistic chance of bringing down his regime and has moreover demonstrated its hostility toward the Kurds, voting against the amnesty bill for the PKK militants.

Öcalan is at an impasse. To have any chance of achieving his professed objective -- a democratic, bi-national republic of Turkey -- he will need to forge an alliance with Turkish progressives who distrust and shun him, and the agreement between him and Erdoğan has only made this harder.

Author's Bio: 

Halil Karaveli is a senior fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center and the Editor of the Turkey Analyst. He is the author of Why Turkey is Authoritarian: From Atatürk to Erdoğan

 

By Emil Avdaliani

The Development Road – a 1200 km long project stretching from Turkey to the Persian Gulf via Iraq – could see renewed momentum for its realization. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz compels Baghdad to look north for sea access via Turkey. For Turkey, the Development Road offers economic benefit, leverage over European supply chains and deeper influence in Iraq. The Hormuz crisis has strengthened Ankara's argument that overland corridors through Turkey are not optional but strategically necessary.

turkey analyst 9-11-26

BACKGROUND: 

The Development Road is a road-and-rail corridor stretching from Iraq’s southern ports near Basra northward to Turkey and then onto the European market. The project is estimated to cost around $17 billion and seeks to turn Iraq into a regional transit hub. Its core geopolitical purpose is to transform Iraq from a state heavily relying on oil exports and plagued by internal instability into a logistics bridge between Asia, the Gulf and Europe.

This is not the first time that the Development Road is being actively discussed. Iraq and Turkey have long expressed interest in the realization of the project. In Iraq, the ambition to position the country as a key transit artery originated in the Cold War era, but could not be realized during the turmoil of the last decades of Saddam Husein’s rule and the chaos that ensued the US invasion. But the Iraqi ambition also has deeper historical roots: the region served as a major transit route for ancient and medieval silk roads linking the Persian Gulf with the Mediterranean world.

Yet, what makes the present attempt to build the project more realistic is Turkey’s growing interest as a result of changed geopolitical circumstances. Turkey has been consistent in its support for the Development Road. One major factor that drives Ankara is the fear that it might be cut out from new routes of regional connectivity. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was proposed in September 2023 and is supported by the United States, Israel, the EU and key Middle Eastern countries explicitly bypassed Turkey.

To avoid being sidelined, Ankara announced the same year that it would double down on its efforts to develop the route through Iraq. Later in April 2024 a quadrilateral memorandum was inked between Iraq, Turkey, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates during President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Iraq. That agreement provided the project a regional framework and brought Gulf capital into a corridor that had previously been exclusively Iraqi-Turkish.

Another factor benefiting the realization of the project is the Middle Eastern conflagration. With the Strait of Hormuz blocked and the Red Sea route under increasing threat, the chances of a successful implementation of the IMEC project are limited. The Iran war and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have deepened Turkey’s interest in accelerating the project and strengthened its argument that overland corridors through Turkey are not optional but strategically necessary.

Ankara wants to position itself as the northern outlet of Gulf trade and a central node between the Middle East and Europe. For Turkey, the Development Road offers economic benefit, leverage over European supply chains and deeper influence in Iraq. The economic rewards promise to be substantial: it is believed that the Development Road will add $55 billion over the next decade to the Turkish economy and create up to 70,000 jobs per year.

For Iraq too, this could be a golden political opportunity. Baghdad has long argued that the Development Road can diversify the economy, generate jobs and reduce reliance on hydrocarbons. The Hormuz crisis makes that argument more convincing to external partners. Europe sees the corridor as part of a broader strategy to reduce dependence on maritime supply routes. Meanwhile, the UAE and Qatar both now have stronger incentives to invest in overland logistics, dry ports and customs infrastructure. The fact that Qatar and the UAE joined the Development Road framework in 2024, well before the Hormuz crisis, is evidence that Gulf states were alert to the need to diversify their export routes.

IMPLICATIONS: 

The disruption of the shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has had a significant effect on global shipping, particularly on the Middle East-Asia trade in oil and gas. Even if and when the Hormuz blockade is lifted, many Asian countries will be compelled to shift their oil and gas supply chains. While the Development Road would not fully replace Hormuz, especially not for crude oil and LNG flows, the project could see a boost to its development as a complementary overland corridor.

For Turkey the Development Road offers an opportunity to elevate its position as a central player in the Middle Eastern connectivity. The project would allow Ankara to incresase its engagement with the Persian and Gulf and eventually also beyond, to the Indian Ocean. This fits into the Turkish ambition of developing close relations with the wealthy Arab monarchies and to reconfigure the region’s trade routes so that they enhanceTurkey’s geopolitical clout.

In 2025 Iraq activated the TIR international transit system with pilot operations between Turkey’s Mersin and Iraq’s Umm Qasr Port. This is significant because it addresses one of the corridor’s core weaknesses: customs, paperwork, and border delays. Iraqi authorities also expanded the operation of the Al-Faw port which is scheduled to reach 3.5 million containers by 2028. This matters for Turkey because without Faw functioning as a major Gulf gateway, the Development Road’s impact will be limited.

Turkey’s Development Road ambitions also fit into a wider context of Turkish geostrategic expansion. In the South Caucasus, Ankara and Yerevan are pushing ahead with their stated goal to open up their long-closed common border and renew direct trade ties. Meanwhile Turkey strives to expand the Middle Corridor through Georgia, Azerbaijan to Central Asia. In Syria and Jordan, Ankara aspires to re-open the Hijaz railway linking the Anatolian heartland with the Arabian peninsula. In a northern direction Turkey serves as a primary commercial route for Russia for its trade with the Mediterranean world and parts of the African continent.

Yet, the Development Road is vulnerable to the disruption of maritime access to the Gulf as that inevitably will hamper trade with Asia. Iraq’s Grand Faw Port can only become a Europe-bound gateway if ships can safely enter the northern Gulf. A full blockade of Hormuz would therefore severely reduce Iraq’s links with the Indian Ocean. So, while the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz increases the strategic demand for an alternative such as the Development Road, it also undermines the project’s commercial potential.

At the same time, higher oil prices could increase Iraq’s fiscal revenues, offering Baghdad more room to fund infrastructure. On the other hand, insurance costs, energy-price volatility and anxiety among investors will raise the cost of capital. Construction materials, machinery and imported equipment risks becoming more expensive or delayed. If the Iran conflict escalates, international contractors may hesitate to work in southern Iraq, especially near Basra. The project already faces governance, security and coordination challenges, and the Hormuz crisis, should it continue indefinitely, will magnify all of them.

The security dimension is likewise important. The Development Road must pass through a country where armed groups, factional politics and external influence remain prevalent. The Hormuz blockade puts Iraq in a geopolitically delicate position. Tehran potentially could hinder the operation of a corridor that would limit Iran’s connectivity role in the region.

CONCLUSION: 

The geopolitical situation in the Middle East has created favorable conditions for the Iraqi-Turkish Development Road. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) that the United States, Israel, the EU and key Middle Eastern countries favor has little chance of being realized any time soon. Meanwhile, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has further elevated the role the Development Road could play.

The Iraqi - Turkish alternative is burdened by its own share of challenges, and the Hormuz blockade won’t necessarily accelerate the realization of the Development Road. Iraq remains plagued by instability, internal divisions and is vulnerable to Iranian meddling.

Yet, Turkey’s growing interest and commitment to the project, along with the pressing need to chart new routes of connectivity, can boost it. In any case, the Hormuz crisis has strengthened Ankara’s argument that overland corridors through Turkey are not optional but strategically necessary.

AUTHOR'S BIO: 

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the hitory of silk roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

 

Earlier Articles

Joint Center Publications

Op-ed Halil Karaveli "The Rise and Rise of the Turkish Right", The New York Times, April 8, 2019

Analysis Halil Karaveli "The Myth of Erdogan's Power", Foreign Policy, August 29, 2018

Analysis Svante E. Cornell, A Road to Understanding in Syria? The U.S. and Turkey, The American Interest, June 2018

Op-ed Halil Karaveli "Erdogan Wins Reelection", Foreign Affairs, June 25, 2018

Article Halil Karaveli "Will the Kurdish Question Secure Erdogan's Re-election?", Turkey Analyst, June 18, 2018

Research Article Svante E. Cornell "Erbakan, Kisakürek, and the Mainstreaming of Extremism in Turkey", Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, June 2018

Analysis Svante E. Cornell "The U.S. and Turkey: Past the Point of No Return?", The American Interest, February 1, 2018

Op-ed Svante E. Cornell "Erdogan's Turkey: the Role of a Little Known Islamic Poet", Breaking Defense, January 2, 2018

Research Article Halil Karaveli "Turkey's Authoritarian Legacy", Cairo Review of Global Affairs, January 2, 2018

 

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The Türkiye Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Türkiye. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.

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