Wednesday, 17 February 2016 00:00

Türköne: the government has committed treason

Mümtazer Türköne in Zaman writes that the Kurdish issue was the most important reason for the survival of the AKP in government, but that the way the state views the party has changed after the PKK was allowed to stockpile arms and ammunition in the cities during the solution process.  Ultimately, the AKP was tolerated by the military, the bureaucracy and the judiciary – after they had struggled for a long while against it – because the continued rule of a party that could get votes all across Turkey was also a gurantee for keeping the state in one piece. But during the solution process, the PKK was able to become entrenched in the cities, stockpiling arms and ammunition there. Carelessness and deliberate mistakes let this happen, and it amounts to treason. Now, those who were responsible for these mistakes are going to pay for them. The current security bureaucracy and the provincial governors who issued the orders of non-intervention against the PKK in the face of reports that it was stockpiling arms are going to be seated next to each other as accused at the coming mass trial. That is the only way for the state to put its house back in order.

Arzu Yılmaz in Birikim writes that the value of the PKK for the Kurdish people is above all that it is a defense force. The Kurds, who felt hopeless in the face of the cruelty they endured for years, managed to acquire relative defensive capability with the PKK.  However, especially what has happened during the last six months has depreciated the value of the PKK as a defense force. There is no ground for presenting the fact that resistance in Sur or in Cizre has continued until today as a success story. What is clearly obvious is that the Kurds are without defense and stand alone in the face of the violence to which they are subjected. What is especially difficult for the Kurds is that they once again find themselves in the position of “victims.” Yet only a year ago, “self-confidence” prevailed among everyone on the streets of Kurdistan. The claim “the Kurds are no longer the old Kurds” above all expressed the conviction that the days of “victimhood” lay behind the Kurds. But that was not true… everyone to whom you speak ask the PKK, “Why did you enter a war that you could not win?” But even if the Kurds criticize the PKK, they are not engaged in any attempt to exclude the PKK. This must above all be realized by the government that is trying to invent new interlocutors in Kurdistan. For the Kurds, the PKK is still, with all its faults, something that belongs to “us.”

Ali Bayramoğlu in Yeni Şafak writes that the geopolitical winds are behind PKK-PYD and against Turkey. Turkey does not have any card up its sleeve that it can deploy to stop the Kurdish region in Syria that it sees as an existential threat. As long as this balance persists across the border, it is not reasonable to expect that Kandil (the headquarters of PKK in northern Iraq) is going to abandon its attempts to establish areas of sovereignty, its strategy of creating cantons, by means of urban warfare and the politics of ditches. The statements of the authorities promising that “soon the cleaning will be finished, and public order will be established,” appear naïve considering past events and the present balances of power. This is so even though a significant part of the population in the region does not approve of the actions of the PKK. This does not mean that they have edged closer to the approach of the state and its position. Isn’t it time that Turkey revises its reading of the region, its view of the Kurdish movements, the Kurdish question and its roadmap for the future?

Wednesday, 17 February 2016 00:00

Yetkin: no, Turkey is not going to invade Syria

Murat Yetkin in Radikal writes that there is no sign that chief of the general staff General Hulusi Akar is going to abandon the military’s traditional line, “Peace in the Homeland, Peace in the world.” Akar is a commander who appreciates very well the importance of relations with NATO, and who knows well what kind of initiative would deprive Turkey of the support of NATO. The Turkish General staff knows that it would not be possible to venture into Syrian airspace without being attacked by Russia; would it then be as amateurish as to plan for an offensive that would have to be carried out without air support? Will the army enter Syria? There’s absolute no sign of this, neither politically nor militarily; the authoritative sources with whom we have spoken emphasize that what is being undertaken is not an “attack” operation, but a “defensive” operation against the mounting threat at the borders. The “Fırtına” artillery shells give General Akar and his team of Commanders assymetrical superiority against the initiatives on the other side of the border. In this way, Turkey wants to make clear that an agreement between the U.S. and Russia that does not take its security preoccupations into consideration is unlikely to be effective. Turkey may not be able to impose what it wants, but neither will the U.S. and Russia get to impose their exclusive will.

Metin Münir on t24 news site writes that the regime in Turkey is engaged in an attempt to reverse what Atatürk and his friends did when they founded the republic in 1923; they are founding a new republic. It is going to a place where conservatives, the pious and the lumpen rule supreme, and where everyone else is excluded; it is going to be a Sunni and not secular, a Middle Eastern and not European Turkey. If Atatürk and his friends had not emerged when the empire fell, Turkey would have been a mix of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. This fate was averted, but the founders of the republic were unable to create a peaceful regime. That was because they did not accept that Turkey is a mosaic that is made up of Turks and Kurds, of Sunnis and Alevis and of many other religious and ethnic minorities. Instead, they erected a regime ruled by secular Turks. That did not work. The emergence of Erdoğan and his friends is the result of this neglect. Now, they are repeating the same mistake in a different way. They have replaced the rule of the secular Turks with the rule of the Sunni Turks – again by disregarding the Alevis and the Kurds and the seculars who have become the biggest minority. This is not going to work either. It is going to crumble. A new order will eventually be created, but only after we have gone through indescribable miseries and destruction.

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Joint Center Publications

Op-ed Halil Karaveli "The Rise and Rise of the Turkish Right", The New York Times, April 8, 2019

Analysis Halil Karaveli "The Myth of Erdogan's Power"Foreign Policy, August 29, 2018

Analysis Svante E. Cornell, A Road to Understanding in Syria? The U.S. and TurkeyThe American Interest, June 2018

Op-ed Halil Karaveli "Erdogan Wins Reelection"Foreign Affairs, June 25, 2018

Article Halil Karaveli "Will the Kurdish Question Secure Erdogan's Re-election?", Turkey Analyst, June 18, 2018

Research Article Svante E. Cornell "Erbakan, Kisakürek, and the Mainstreaming of Extremism in Turkey", Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, June 2018

Analysis Svante E. Cornell "The U.S. and Turkey: Past the Point of No Return?"The American Interest, February 1, 2018

Op-ed Svante E. Cornell "Erdogan's Turkey: the Role of a Little Known Islamic Poet", Breaking Defense, January 2, 2018

Research Article Halil Karaveli "Turkey's Authoritarian Legacy"Cairo Review of Global Affairs, January 2, 2018

 

The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.

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