Etyen Mahçupyan in Akşam writes that it is not easy to plan and execute an act of terrorism.  The needs of organization increase the likelihood that the suicide attack in Ankara had a foreign source. The purpose can be to render Turkey incapable of exerting influence in the Middle East by burying it in internal problems.  Alongside this, there can be said to exist results that are wanted when it comes to the internal politics: such as, to spread hopelessness among the public, undermine faith in the state, to paralyze the government, to create a vacuum of authority, to render internal peace impossible… We need to bear in mind that the massacre took place at a juncture when it was being said that the PKK was going to declare a cease fire, as the government was conducting operations against ISIS within the country and as the Syrian air defense system had locked on Turkish war planes. 

Ali Bulaç in Zaman observes that the “Kurdish problem” is at the center of the massacres that have taken place in Diyarbakır, Suruç and Ankara. The mass killings are in fact targeting a development that had promised to yield a peaceful solution. The deep forces within the state who do not want the Kurdish problem to be solved, international actors and certain elements of the PKK dislike that the HDP, after its surge in the June 7 election, has embarked on a path toward embracing the whole of Turkey. They started their disgusting terror just after the HDP had 80 deputies elected to parliament. I do not think that the AKP, the government or those state levers that sincerely hope for a solution of this problem have had anything to do with the restart of the terror. But I do not think that it would be right to dismiss those who suspect that the coup makers who have regained strength during the last two years, deep groups, foreign powers and certain elements of the PKK are in collusion as conspiracy theorists. The explosion in Ankara targeted the whole of the country, and sought to blow up the hope for peace. They are setting a trap for all of us.

Abdülkadir Selvi in Yeni Şafak writes that support for the AKP seems to be around 44 percent at the start of the election campaign. That means an increase of three percentage points compared to the result on June 7. There are three main reasons for the AKP’s increase. First, the governmental vacuum that has reigned since June 7 has made those who care about stability to turn to the AKP. Second, one to two percentage points are made up of returning voters from the MHP, in reaction to the intransigency of MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli after the election, when he refused to consider a coalition [with the AKP] and stayed out of the [caretaker] government when the fight against PKK had started. The third factor is those who voted for the [Islamist] Felicity Party and The Party of Grand Unity (BBP) on June 7, and who are now concluding that “Our votes did not have any effect on the political equation. Let’s now make sure that we get a majority government.”