By Vali Kaleji

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the long-standing Turkish-Iranian rivalry has intensified in the region. Ankara will make the most of the challenges that Iran has suffered in the Middle East, advancing its geopolitical and economic goals and ambitions in the region to the detriment of Iranian interests. Tehran fears that Turkey will now be emboldened to make further headway in the South Caucasus to the detriment of Iranian interests and that it will disseminate Pan-Turkism and incite ethnic unrest and divisions in the Azeri and Kurdish areas in the northwest of Iran. Ultimately though the two countries prefer caution and seek to contain their rivalry. Turkey and Iran have a shared interest in limiting the scope of their rivalry, foreclosing military escalation.

BACKGROUND: Shiite Iran and Sunni Turkey have maintained relations relation without direct military confrontation for nearly 400 years, with their common border unchanged since the signing of the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639.  Notwithstanding, Turkish-Iranian rivalry has been a constant in the Middle East and in the Caucasus. Since 2011 the geopolitical competition between Iran and Turkey has largely played out in Syria, where Ankara supported the rebellion and Tehran the Assad regime. Turkey opposes the agenda of the so-called Axis of Resistance, groups aligned with and/or backed by Iran operating across the Middle East. Ankara’s support for Hamas has been only rhetorical and it has not displayed any sympathy for Hezbollah in Lebanon. On November 21, 2024, after a missile attack targeted a cargo ship in the Red Sea, Ankara sent 6 warships to counter and suppress the Yemeni Houthis, Iran’s proxies. Although “The Astana Process” was launched in 2017 at the initiative of Iran, Russia and Turkey to reduce tensions in Syria, the competition and differences between Iran and Russia with Turkey persisted.</>

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei blamed the United States, Israel and Turkey for the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, after a lightning offensive by Sunni Islamist rebels toppled the regime last year. He said in a public speech that “there should be no doubt that what happened in Syria was plotted in the command rooms of the United States and Israel. We have evidence for this. One of the neighbouring countries of Syria also played a role, but the primary planners are the US and the Zionist regime”. There was no doubt that the neighbouring country that the Iranian leader had in mind was Turkey. Indeed, Iranian analysts largely agreed that the evolving situation in Syria would lead to a new phase of regional competition between Tehran and Ankara.

Turkey has demonstrated that it intends to play a decisive role in shaping the future of Syria and it stands to reap the benefits of the reconstruction of the country. Iran meanwhile, whose overall economic expenditure in Syria is valued at around $20-30 billion, can no longer expect to enjoy any access to Syria. Moreover, the loss of Syria deprives Iran of crucial transit corridors. The creation of the Iran-Iraq-Syria corridor was one of Iran's strategic goals to strengthen its influence in the Middle East region and secure access to the Mediterranean. But with the fall of the Assad regime this transit corridor is no longer viable. Turkey, meanwhile, is seeking implement a 17-billion-dollar “Development Road Project,” which consists of two rail and land routes, in cooperation with Iraq. This transit project could potentially bloc Iran's attempts in transit and transportation in the Persian Gulf, Iraq and the Eastern Mediterranean.

IMPLICATIONS: Iran is also concerned about the revival of the Qatar-Turkey pipeline project with the transfer of Qatar's natural gas through a pipeline that passes through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria to Turkey and brings it to the European market. Although this pipeline faces important challenges – it would notably pass through currently Kurdish-controlled areas in northern Syria where Turkey is yet to assert its authority and secure the disarmament of the PKK affiliated Kurdish militia – its realization can be an alternative not only for the export of Iranian gas to Turkey, but also for the export of Russian gas to Europe. There is no doubt that the revival of the Qatar-Turkey pipeline project would increase Turkey’s bargaining power in the pricing of imported gas from the two competing powers Iran and Russia.

Moreover, Tehran fears that Turkey, after the fall of the Assad regime, will be emboldened to make further headway in the South Caucasus to the detriment of Iranian interests. Specifically, there is a concern in Iran, as well as in Armenia, that Azerbaijan, encouraged and supported by Turkey, will launch an attack on the Syunik province in the south of Armenia in order to realize the Zangezur Corridor and a direct land connection to Nakhichevan.

Iran is strongly opposed to the Zangezur Corridor due to the threat of blockage of the common border with Armenia – without the supervision and control of Armenia – and such an attack, if it were to take place, would obviously have far reaching regional ramifications, further tipping the balance of power in the South Caucasus in favour of the Baku-Ankara axis. A realization of the Zangezur Corridor as a part of the Middle Corridor, parallel to the realization of the “Development Road Project” between Iraq and Turkey, will inevitably reduce Iran's transit advantages in the region. Further, the realization of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, along with the revival of the Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline project represents an important challenge for Iran's gas exports in the region.

Another major, indeed existential concern for Iran is that Turkey may seek to disseminate Pan-Turkism and incite ethnic unrest and divisions in the Azerbaijani and Kurdish areas in the northwest of Iran. Such concerns have been fuelled by the December, 2024 launch of the Persian-language service of Turkey's state television channel (TRT). Tehran is particularly sensitive, not least since the director of the TRT media Mehmet Sobacı on October 14, 2024 said “We are to open the TRT Persian channel at the end of this year. We must disturb Iran; we must disturb Iran!” Although he was subsequently dismissed, the controversial comments sparked debate and was met with strong criticism in Iran. In what looked like a direct response to the Turkish move, the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Peyman Jebeli on January 21, 2025 announced that a Turkish section of Press TV will start broadcasting.

CONCLUSIONS: With the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, Iran has lost a crucial strategic ally in the Middle East and its longstanding regional policy has suffered challenges. Turkey, meanwhile, has gained the strategic upper hand and is advancing its geopolitical and economic goals and ambitions in the region which worries Iran. But the two countries prefer caution and seek to contain their rivalry. This was on display when İbrahim Kalın, the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) on February 8 visited Tehran for discussions with senior Iranian security officials, including Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Akbar Ahmadian and Minister of Intelligence Seyed Esmail Khatib. The discussions focused on Syria, the war in Gaza and on countering the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Daesh (ISIL or ISIS), and other terrorist groups, as well as other shared security threats. This suggests that Iran is aware of the threat to security by the PKK-affiliated Syrian Kurds. For this reason, Iran has welcomed Abdullah Ocalan’s call to disarm and dissolve the PKK. Such a move would have dangerous repercussions in the Kurdistan region of Iraq and possibly also in the Kurdish regions in Iran.

Ankara will try to make the most of the challenges that Iran has suffered in the Middle East. In addition, Turkey feels that it has the advantage in the new round of competition with Iran. But Turkey and Iran nonetheless recognize that they have a shared interest in limiting the scope of their rivalry, foreclosing military escalation.

Vali Kaleji is based in Tehran, Iran, and holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asia and Caucasian Studies.

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