By M. K. Kaya (vol. 2, no. 9 of the Turkey Analyst)

On May 1, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the first, major cabinet reshuffle since the AKP came to power in 2002. While eight ministers were left out of the new cabinet, nine new ministers were appointed, and one minister was given new responsibilities. The comprehensive cabinet revision signals that the Justice and Development Party’s leadership is above all intent on reasserting the party’s conservative core in order to revive the party’s fortunes. However, the neglect of other political currents could eventually prove to be costly for the AKP.

By Svante E. Cornell (vol. 2, no. 7 of the Turkey Analyst)

The past several weeks have seen the level of diplomatic rumoring on a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement reach new heights. The Turkish government embarked on this endeavor seriously last Summer, a move that could redraw the geopolitics of the Caucasus in unpredictable ways, depending on how it is undertaken. While the initiative had much to do with Turkish-US relations, the Obama visit paradoxically coincided with Ankara being forced to hit the brakes on the issue, at least temporarily. It has once again been made clear that the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict remains the major security challenge in the region, and that it needs to be tackled head on.

By Gareth Jenkins (vol. 2, no. 3 of the Turkey Analyst) 

In recent months, the policies of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have become increasingly shaped by the personality of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Freed from perceived constraints, Erdogan now often appears to be driven by his emotions rather than considered deliberation. Even if his confrontational style has boosted his domestic public popularity, any short-term personal political gains are likely to be more than offset by the long-term damage to Turkey’s economy and its relations with Europe and the US.

By M. K. Kaya (vol. 2, no. 2 of the Turkey Analyst) 

The appointment of Egemen Bagis as new chief negotiator and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to the EU Commission in Brussels on 18–20 January signals the start of a new era in Turkey-EU relations. Although they are important, these steps taken by Ankara will evidently not be enough. The future of Turkey’s EU accession process depends on political developments in Turkey as well as in Europe. But there can be no doubt that the EU membership process remains a crucial political asset for the governing AKP.

By M. K. Kaya (vol. 1, no. 18 of the Turkey Analyst) 

Faced with an increasingly intractable problem of PKK terrorism, coupled with increasing tensions in society between citizens of ethnic Turkish and Kurdish origin, the governing AKP appears to have moved to the right. Erdogan’s rhetoric has become increasingly nationalistic, aligning itself more with the military brass on issues concerning the PKK, the Kurdish question in general, and Iraq. This has led to some discontent among ethnic Kurdish forces within the AKP, which have been an important support base for the party. The split was most clearly visible in the resignation of the AKP’s deputy Chairman and prominent politician of Kurdish origin, Dengir Firat. This likely has important implications for the AKP’s electoral hopes in upcoming local elections, not least in the Southeast.