İbrahim Karagül in Yeni Şafak writes: we knew that they were planning a major crisis, like the one at Gezi Park (in 2013), involving a sectarian identity, after the Gezi and the failure of the December 17, 2013 coup attempt. The Gezi project was an international intervention aiming to ignite an Alevi uprising in Turkey. Everyone in Turkey knows who were behind it, which country’s intelligence agency directed the Alevi organizations in Europe, how this country financed this street terror together with its partners in Turkey, what role the capital groups within Turkey assumed. A very nasty plan was put to work in order to remove Erdoğan and his team from power. This failure initiated the December 17 coup attempt. The playmakers behind the international conspiracy this time deployed the Fethullah Gülen group. Now, the third attempt is starting. This time the alliance is broader. The Gezi and December 17 saboteurs have come together and formed a united point. The role as the armed wing of this new alliance is assigned to DHKP-C (The terrorist group that took the prosecutor hostage in Istanbul last week, an incident that ended with the prosecutor and the two assailants being killed.) After the ethnic fighting that stole thirty years from Turkey, they are now giving the start of an internal fighting over sectarian identity, with the use of DHKP-C.
TÜRKÖNE: HOW MUCH VOTES WILL POLITICAL VIOLENCE BRING AKP?
Mümtazer Türköne in Zaman asks – to whom does terrorism bring votes? A government that is suspected of graft is – as could be expected – mobilizing every kind of lies and intrigues in order to win the election. Once they have lost power, they are going to be hand-cuffed and brought before the court of law. For God’s sake, doesn’t the murder of the prosecutor, and then the attack against the Police Headquarters in Istanbul make that a less likely outcome? Everyone knows that DHKP-C is a subcontractor organization that earns its living from terrorism. Let’s ask the most crucial question: What acts of terrorism are you planning during the run-up to the elections? How many votes are you aiming to get as a result of these acts? I am saying this clearly: The martyrdom of the prosecutor was a cause for great satisfaction among the ruling circles. They are having a hard time suppressing the happiness they feel behind a sad expression on their faces. Let’s repeat the question: What was the objective of the terrorist act at Çağlayan?
ENGİN: KILLING THE PROSECUTOR PAVES THE WAY FOR THE POLICE STATE
Aydın Engin in Cumhuriyet writes I cannot know where, how and by whom this act was planned; but it smells of provocation. It is clear that it is going to serve the purpose of political destabilization. The people at the top of AKP are using this act as an excuse for hitting at especially the CHP. They are going as far back as to the Gezi protests and have the audacity to claim that the CHP has given the green light to these kinds of acts. But the attempt to produce “dirty politics” out of what happened at Çağlayan (where the prosecutor was killed) is in fact revealing itself in the case of the Internal Security Bill that has the potential to turn the country into a real police state. The highest representatives of the government are clearly expressing that that the implementation of the Internal Security Bill is going to be even harsher. Their excuse is the Çağlayan action and the actions that followed upon it. If these excuses are not enough, who will be surprised if there are new provocations in order to persuade the public to surrender to the methods of the police state? That is what I mean when I talk about using Çağlayan to produce dirty politics.
AKSAY: IS DEMİRTAŞ IN DANGER OF BEING ASSASSINATED?
Hakan Aksay on the t24 news site notes that Selahattin Demirtaş, the co-chairman of the pro-Kurdish HDP in a speech recently evoked the risk that he might be killed during the election campaign. Demirtaş called attention to a serious threat. Erdoğan has no tolerance for defeat. He only wants victory. HDP and its leader Demirtaş is a special target because of the role that they will have in the election. The reason is clear: If HDP passes the ten percent threshold to parliament, Erdoğan’s plans are going to be foiled. Also, Demirtaş is putting up a tough opposition to Erdoğan and the government. Despite the threats against the co-chairman of HDP, no action has been taken by the authorities. The question is why. Maybe the answer is provided by Demirtaş. He says, ”Believe me, the government could not care less about the peace of this country, about democracy. When they start to slip in the polls, when they face the prospect of being voted out of their position of power, they will commit any kind of madness.” Let us hope that Demirtaş is mistaken, let us hope that the government is not going to take the risk of committing any kind of mad act.
BURSALI: AKP-PKK ARE NEVER GOING TO BE ABLE TO IMPOSE THEIR CONSTITUTION ON THE MAJORITY
Orhan Bursalı in Cumhuriyet argues that a grand bargain between the AKP and the Kurdish political movement after the election is very likely. The Kurds, the PKK, are fighting for identity recognition, for autonomy. Everything that does not help them to achieve these goals by definition lies beyond their range of interest. Thus, it is unavoidable that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan/the government and the Kurdish forces are going to sit down for a constitutional bargain. If as a result of this bargaining, the Kurds face the prospect of getting Kurdish identity in return for letting Erdoğan have his presidential system, then the Kurds are going to go along with it. But there is another crucial point here. The AKP and the PKK are not going to be able to impose their common constitution on this people. A constitution that is resisted by more than half of the people and which has not been written with the participation of the majority will simply be headed to the dustbin. No one is going to take such a constitution seriously; at the end of the day it will be torn apart and thrown away. There will be civil war. No one should delude themselves.
