By Halil M. Karaveli and M.K. Kaya (vol. 3, no. 6 of the Turkey Analyst)
Opinion polls in Turkey show that there is a very real possibility that the next general election may return one or two of the nationalist opposition parties, CHP and MHP to power. The nationalist opposition, together with strong resistance within the ruling AKP itself and the government’s mishandling of those initiatives, has in fact already helped force the AKP to abandon its openings to Armenia and to the Kurdish minority. A Turkey ruled by the secularist-nationalists would be more circumspect in its dealings with Muslim countries. Yet in a fundamental sense, the secularist-nationalists are, just like the current government, inclined to defy the West, strategically as well as ideologically.
By Rafis Abazov (vol. 2, no. 22 of the Turkey Analyst)
Recent Turkish foreign policy initiatives have asserted the country’s growing influence in its neighborhood. One of the important, yet overlooked, factors that underpin Turkey’s growing clout in international affairs is the demographic dynamics. Today’s Turkey is a country of about 76 million people, up from 56.5 million in 1990, making it the second largest European NATO country after Germany. However, the recent report by the UNFPA estimates that by 2050 the population of Turkey will reach 100 million people, making it the largest country in Europe outside Russia. This change has important implications that will affect the new geopolitical and geo-economic balance in Europe. However, although demographics offer Turkey an advantage, it also calls for well-balanced economic policies.
By Hüseyin Bağcı (vol. 2, no. 22 of the Turkey Analyst)
Turkey’s recent international initiatives and not least its “openings” to neighbors with whom relations have traditionally been less than friendly, signal a qualitative as well as quantitative change of what was once a defensive and cautious foreign policy. Turkish as well as international observers are experiencing difficulties as they try to make sense of what is perceived as Turkey’s “new orientation”. Although it may be tempting to conclude that Turkey is being “lost” for the West, the country does in fact remain a principally Western power, albeit one that enjoys a much greater room for maneuver in the international arena than ever before.
By M. K. Kaya (vol. 2, no. 21 of the Turkey Analyst)
With its Kurdish opening, the Turkish government has set out to reinvent Turkey, in order to secure the integrity of the state and consolidate society. The AKP is succeeding in reaching out to the Kurds. However, the opening is being met with stiff opposition from Turkish nationalists, and the AKP will ignore that opposition at its own peril. The Kurdish imperative also plays an important if hidden role behind some of Turkey’s recent, controversial foreign policy initiatives.
By Barry Rubin (vol. 2, no. 19 of the Turkey Analyst)
The Turkey-Israel alliance is over. After more than two decades of close cooperation, the Turkish government is no longer interested in maintaining close cooperation with Israel. Nor is it—for all practical purposes—willing to do anything much to maintain its good relations with Israel. The absence of any substantial, public criticism in Turkey of the Turkish government’s break with Israel does suggest the Turkish-Israeli relationship lacked deeper roots in Turkish society, and hence the potential to become a permanent one.
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.