Kadri Gürsel in Cumhuriyet notes that in the new war that started in July 2015, cities inside Turkey’s border are being demolished. More than twenty years ago, it was the villages that were burnt down and emptied of their inhabitants. The path that was to lead on to the new war of destructing the cities was engaged in the fall of 2013. In September 2013, PKK accused Ankara of not taking necessary steps in the peace process and declared that it was halting the withdrawal of its armed elements from Turkey. After this, both sides used the so called process to gain time to improve their own position. Yet, a real and dynamic political solution process was necessary in order to bring about a positive and permanent change of PKK’s violent political culture. The solution process was a fake and for this reason, the natural inclination of PKK – in accordance with its goal of autonomy – was to organize an armed, urban resistance, and engage in the “war of the trenches.” The method that the regime chose to dislodge the PKK and its base from the cities is the worst possible one in terms of the future of the country. The scorched earth tactic of the 1990’s is carried on with burnt down and erased cities. When the villages were burnt down, their inhabitants flocked to the cities where HDP’s vote is around ninety percent. Time will tell what we will face now that these cities in turn have been erased. This is not a sustainable policy. If the holders of state power persist with this attitude, they might one day decide to target the people directly, after first having targeted their villages and now their cities. Then, Turkey will become unsustainable. That’s what I fear.
Ali Bulaç in Yarına Bakış writes that Turkey had the chance to provide a model of successful Islamist governance, and asks why it failed. Turkey could have been different, but unfortunately it didn’t happen. If every group had shown the maturity of sharing the work of governing with each other, while at the same time conserving their autonomy, then the process that started in 2002 would have ended with making Turkey a role model for the Middle East. We have to concede that the Muslims were unable to share power, and that they failed to construct a just power. They have forfeited nearly all of the gains that were made since 1960; indeed, the gains relating to freedoms and rights that had been obtained since parliamentary democracy was established in 1950 have been surrendered. This has more than one reason. Two principal reasons stand out: The first is the incompatibility between the two strands of Islam in Turkey that has never been surmounted, between the National Outlook movement and the Nurcu strand or strands; the other reason is that the religious fraternities, as soon as they glimpsed the light of power in the 21st century, reverted to the Ottoman tradition of seeing themselves as the prolongation of the state in society and engaged in a race to become the state’s most privileged group. Meanwhile, Muslim intellectuals quickly embraced the opportunity of becoming the official servants of the state. Anyone who chooses Turkey as model will repeat this mistake.
Güray Öz in Cumhuriyet writes that it is obvious that the AKP is working to bring about a fundamental regime change, and he says that this aligns with bourgeois class interests. One could say that the objective is to put in place an “eastern despotic” regime that is Sunni Islamic in ideological terms. This will inevitably have certain consequences for those who have so far engaged with Western capital and politics in terms of their economic and cultural relations; they will have to be “persuaded.” In fact, we can observe that the capitalist class is content, that its profits are doubling, and that they are prepared to share their gains (with new business interests.) They may not be fully content with the country’s course, but it will not be difficult to persuade them. What we are talking about is not any resistance of some members of the capitalist class, but of some unease. International “concerns” also fall into this category; international players are busy trying to convince the ruling party and its leader to be more “middle of the road.” Unfortunately, those who could make a difference about where Turkey is headed -- those who defend the interests of popular classes -- are not in any position to influence the country’s course. Unless leftists, progressives and democrats get their act together, “Islamic despotism” will not be easy to dissolve.
Özgür Mumcu in Cumhuriyet notes that the presence of the chief of the general staff, General Hulusi Akar, as a witness as the wedding of Sümeyye Erdoğan, the youngest of President Erdoğan’s daughters, provoked angry reactions among those who – like betrayed lovers -- are used to pinning their hopes on the military. This is not a meaningful reaction, but apparently we needed a wedding picture to realize what the power structure looks like. It was the military-industrial complex that posed for the wedding picture. This is the situation of the military that some hope so much from. And the same goes for the “Istanbul capital” that again, some expect will provide salvation. These capital interests are standing in line to get defense contracts (from the state). Erdoğan, the military, big capital and MHP form a united front. The wedding picture is instructive: it reminds that democracy will not come with the help of big capital and the military. Erdoğan, capital, the army and MHP are hand in hand. Had the laws about contract labor passed so easily if it hadn’t been for this alliance? The power relations are as easy to read as an open book: A united rightist bloc, behind it big capital, and the military as its assurance. These are all well-known themes for the left, for a left that once again needs to bring back class to the center of the political agenda.
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.