By Toni Alaranta
September 1, 2017
After fifteen years of Islamic-conservative state transformation, it is increasingly difficult to unmake the ideological-material powerbase that keeps the AKP in power. The state transformation project in Turkey has not only changed the circumstances within which any opposition group needs to operate, it has also, to a large extent, started to change the very language that can be used while addressing the most essential socio-political issues. One of the most explicit indications of the AKP’s ability to redefine the sociopolitical horizons is the worrisome lack of Western-inclined forces in Turkey. The Kemalist circles are arguably excessively nationalist. However, they, unlike the liberals, at least have a relatively coherent constituency and ideology for mass mobilization. And the liberals cannot hope to succeed in building a democratic society without a direct backing from some type of nationalist-inclined mass movement.
By Gareth H. Jenkins
March 31, 2017
Whatever the outcome, the Turkish constitutional referendum on April 16 will not resolve the country’s chronic domestic instability, heal its deepening social divisions, revive its flagging economy or end its growing international isolation. But it will shape both the nature of the further turbulence to come and the duration of what is already the final stage of the Erdoğan era.
By Gareth H. Jenkins
July 22, 2016
Many of the details of the failed putsch in Turkey on July 15, 2016 still remain unclear. But, although it is possible that there was some form of involvement, there are problems with the narrative being peddled by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) that it was a purely Gülenist affair. What is clear is that, driven by a combination of opportunism and fear, President Tayyip Erdoğan has seized on the putsch to launch a massive crackdown that could severely destabilize an already very fragile country.
By Nathan Shachar
July 8, 2016
Whatever dividends the fresh Turkish-Israeli rapprochement will bring, it reveals something fundamental about the new Middle East: the number of unknown variables in this ever less predictable environment is steadily growing, and even the most arrogant and unrepentant leaders will have to eat crow from time to time in order to salvage their national interests. Leaders who stand by their words and their principles will be severely handicapped.
Levent Gültekin in Diken writes that many people that he has met recently all wonder why intellectuals, businessmen, the “reasonable people” of the country don’t come together to lead a societal opposition. There are a couple of reasons for this. The first is the widespread expectation that something is going to happen, which will change the course of the country, and which will lead to the departure of Erdoğan. Many people refrain from sticking out their necks because they assume that Erdoğan is anyway going to run into the wall someday. The second reason is that no really strong and influential class of democratic intellectuals has formed in this country. The third, and the most important reason, is that the opposition is mostly made up of leftists and liberals. The right -- the nationalists-conservatives-Islamists -- is beholden to the government. Some think opposing it would only serve the interests of the PKK, others see it as damaging the “government of the pious.” Thus, the mission to bring life to societal opposition mostly falls on leftist and liberal intellectuals. But the left is itself torn apart by long-standing divisions.
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.