By Lars Haugom
September 30, 2016
The Turkish military is undergoing a comprehensive post-coup restructuring process. It is not difficult to understand the rationale behind increased civilian government control of the armed forces after the July 15 coup attempt. However, the Turkish government aims to increase civilian political control and oversight with the armed forces, and not civilian democratic control. There is a risk that the Turkish Armed Forces will become a more politicized and dysfunctional organisation, with greater internal rivalry between the branches and an even more restive officers’ corps as a result of some of these changes.
By Svante E. Cornell
July 20, 2016
The failed military coup in Turkey provides a window into just how unstable and vulnerable Turkey has become. The coup is a unique but not isolated event, more than anything a symptom of the decay of Turkish state institutions under Erdogan. The sizable post-coup repression will make matters worse, in fact increasing rather than decreasing the risk of further violence, including a new coup. Turkey is now more a problem in its own right than an ally to help solve regional problems.
Metin Gürcan in t24 writes the ISIS needs Turkey. ISIS has not yet declared Turkey a war zone. While ISIS is steadily losing ground in Syria and Iraq, Turkey is a centre for it in terms of logistics and finance. I see that the Turkey strategy of ISIS has four different levels: First, it aims to create a division between on the one hand Sunnis who become more Salafist and others, by carrying out acts of violence that increase the already significant tension along the sectarian, ethnic and political fault lines in Turkey. Second, it seeks to ensure that Turkey does not become an active member of the global anti-ISIS coalition by attacking foreigners in Turkey. Third, it seeks to radicalize the Islamist youth in Turkey that has become increasingly alienated from the traditional Islamic structures. Fourth, it will encourage the ideologically radicalized to take radical action, exporting the extremist Salafist groups that it has raised in the Turkish pool abroad. In fact, we can see that ISIS is very good at following the evolution of political Islam in Turkey, in recognizing that it can steal a role in the wake of the power struggle between the AKP and the Gülen fraternity, and as a result of the fact that traditional Turkish Islamism has fared so badly in its encounter with capitalism: this is something that increases the popularity of jihadist Salafist movements among increasingly alienated young Islamists in Turkey.
By Gareth H. Jenkins
May 11, 2016
Ahmet Davutoğlu has left as he came, not in response to popular demand but at President Erdoğan’s behest. Apparently unsighted by his unfailing self-belief, Davutoğlu was caught unprepared when Erdoğan made his move. The overthrow of Davutoğlu has demonstrated the naivety of the EU’s policy of appeasement. The EU officials believed that by focusing on Davutoğlu, they were strengthening him politically as a counterweight to Erdoğan. This may have been naïve, self-serving or both. It was certainly not true. But it did reinforce Erdoğan’s suspicions of Davutoğlu.
By Gareth H. Jenkins
April 20, 2016
Although the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) are ideologically affiliated, they remain organizationally distinct. Even though it does not pose a direct security threat to Turkey, the PYD’s increasing consolidation of power in northern Syria arguably poses a challenge not only to Ankara but also to the PKK.
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.