Turkey Raises Central Asian Profile Through SCO Link
By Richard Weitz (vol. 5, no. 14 of the Turkey Analyst)
The decision of the June 6-7 annual meeting of the heads of state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Beijing to designate Turkey a formal dialogue partner of the organization is yet another sign of recognition of Turkey’s growing influence in Central and South Asia. Turkey’s new status may also reinforce Ankara’s influence in the region, especially now that other NATO members are reducing their presence in Afghanistan. But Turkey still confronts major obstacles to pursuing its ambitious diplomatic agenda in Central and South Asia. China was likely supportive of deepening the SCO’s ties with Turkey, but Turkey’s relations with Russia might worsen, which in that case will constrain Turkish influence in Central Asia.
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline: a Geopolitical Achievement, but no Panacea for Turkey's Energy Independence
By M. Kemal Kaya (vol. 5, no. 14 of the Turkey Analyst)
The realization of the Trans-Anatolian Project by 2018 will strengthen Azerbaijan in strategic terms, offering it a route to the world markets that bypasses Russia. The realization of TANAP is a significant geostrategic setback for Russia. However, TANAP is no panacea for Turkey’s energy predicament. Turkey will remain dependent on Russia as a natural gas supplier.
Turkey and Syria: an Undeclared State of War
By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 5, no. 13 of the Turkey Analyst)
After Syria’s downing of a Turkish aircraft over the eastern Mediterranean, the question is not so much why Syria shot it down as why the two neighbors have become embroiled in a confrontation in the first place; more precisely why the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey decided to commit itself to bringing about regime change in Syria, by which it assumed significant risks. That choice speaks of the impact that sectarian reflexes is increasingly having on Ankara’s foreign policy. What beckons enticingly for Turkey’s ruling Sunni conservatives is a pro-Turkish “Sunni crescent”, stretching from Gaza over Syria to northern Iraq. However, Turkey courts danger by assuming the role as a leading Sunni power in the sectarian confrontation in the Middle East.
Erdogan's Invitation to Gulen: Reconciliation or Power Play?
By Gareth H. Jenkins (vol. 5, no. 13 of the Turkey Analyst)
On June 14, 2012, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly invited Fethullah Gülen, the leader of the powerful Gülen Movement, to return to Turkey from self-imposed exile in the United States. On June 16, 2012, in a videoed interview, Gülen declined the invitation, breaking down in tears as he expressed his fears that his return could be exploited to destabilize the country and damage his movement’s achievements. In recent months, Erdoğan and members of the Gülen Movement have been engaged in a bitter power struggle. As a result, Erdoğan’s invitation to Gülen was interpreted by some commentators as a reconciliatory peace offering. However, it would probably be more accurate to interpret it as a challenge to Gülen, an assertion of authority in the guise of a magnanimous gesture.
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