By M. Kemal Kaya and Svante E. Cornell (vol. 5, no. 5 of the Turkey Analyst)

When a special prosecutor attempted to bring in five high intelligence officers (including the head of Turkish intelligence) for questioning, he also cracked the veneer of the AKP’s supposedly consolidated hold on power in the country. Indeed, developments in Turkey since Sadrettin Sarıkaya issued his subpoenas have shown with all clarity a deep split in the ranks of the informal coalition on which the AKP bases its power. That split had thus far been growing but never openly manifested; now, a power struggle between the AKP and the Gülen movement is unraveling. It is unlikely to be easily bridged.

By Richard Weitz (vol. 5, no. 4 of the Turkey Analyst)

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has just completed a well-timed visit to Washington. Although many issues arose during his multi-day rounds of meetings with congressional and executive branch figures, the topic that invariably drew the most attention in public, and likely in private, was what to do about Syria now that the diplomatic initiatives have been exhausted. Turkey and the United States have been aligning their policies toward Syria throughout the crisis, and Washington expects Turkey to assume a leading public role in any future initiative in its southern neighbor. Yet no specific new initiatives were announced by either party during Davutoğlu’s Washington visit. As has been indicated by Turkish and U.S. diplomats, the U.S. and Turkey prefer to consult with other governments also seeking a firmer stance toward Syria before committing to a concrete action plan.

By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 5, no. 4 of the Turkey Analyst)

The authority of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been challenged by the security apparatus, the police and parts of the judiciary that enjoy the backing of the brotherhood of the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen. The unprecedented challenge compels Erdoğan to circumscribe the power of his erstwhile ally, which thrives with the application of oppressive security measures. Whether Erdoğan will now see the strong incentive to seek a democratic, negotiated solution to the Kurdish issue, or continue to concentrate power in his own hands, remains to be seen.