By Gareth H. Jenkins (vol. 6, no. 16 of the Turkey Analyst) 

On September 9, 2013, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced that it had halted the phased withdrawal of its militants from Turkey but would continue with its temporary ceasefire in order to give the Turkish government a last opportunity to meets its demands for greater rights for the country’s Kurdish minority.

by Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 6, no. 15 of the Turkey Analyst)

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s resurrection of the ideological militancy of a bygone era is not a recipe for political success. The class dynamics that once brought about the moderation of the Turkish Islamic movement are even stronger today. Differences of culture and life style still separate the two middle classes of Turkey, the religiously conservative Anatolian bourgeoisie and the secular bourgeoisie. Yet, Turkey’s political future will likely be shaped by their synergy, indeed alliance. It is reasonable to expect that the material interests of the combined bourgeoisie will revive political moderation.

by Gareth Jenkins (vol. 6 no. 13 of the Turkey Analyst)

On July 3, 2013, it was announced that the First Administrative Court in Istanbul had cancelled the Taksim Square and Gezi Park redevelopment project that had triggered the unprecedented anti-government protests that have been sweeping Turkey since late May. The verdict has still to be ratified by the higher court known as the Danıştay, or Council of State. Whatever the Danıştay’s decision, there can be little doubt that the protests have already permanently changed the Turkish political landscape. 

by Svante E. Cornell (vol. 6, no. 12 of the Turkey Analyst)

The popular upheavals in Turkey, and the harsh government crackdown on them, have reshuffled the power struggle that was already ongoing within Turkey’s Islamic conservative movement. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s ambitions to remake Turkey into a presidential republic have been dashed for the foreseeable future. While he remains the undisputed leader of both the country and the movement, none of the options facing him are particularly appealing. Taksim may well mark the beginning of the end of Erdoğan’s single-handed domination of Turkish politics.

by Svante E. Cornell (vol. 6, no. 8 of the Turkey Analyst)

Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hardly hides his ambition to accede to the presidency under a new constitution providing for a presidential system. Yet his ambition for a further concentration of power in his own hands is beginning to generate unlikely counter-forces. Chief among these is the growing coordination among other forces on the Turkish political spectrum – including the CHP, the Fethullah Gülen movement, and president Abdullah Gül. The latter, in particular, is beginning to more vocally distance himself from Erdoğan in both domestic and foreign affairs. While it may be too early to talk of a rupture, Gül is becoming an important counter-balance to Erdoğan.