By Michael Tanchum

With record-breaking arms exports globally, Turkey’s growing market share in the Arab monarchies holds the potential to greatly expand Ankara’s role as a security provider across the Middle East and North Africa.  At the same time, Turkey faces growing competition from Israel and India, which have significantly expanded their own weapons sales to the Arab monarchies, notably the UAE and Morocco. Deepening defense cooperation in ways that Turkey has not, Israel and India have engaged in the co-development of weapons systems with Arab defense firms and have established local weapons manufacturing in the Arab world. The next phase in the competition for the MENA weapons market share, as well as the regional geopolitical clout that accompanies it, could be determined by Saudi Arabia, raising Ankara’s geopolitical stakes in securing a sizable purchase of Turkish weapons by Riyadh. 

The 2025 deal builds upon Saudi Arabia’s 2023 agreement to buy high altitude drones from Baykar, but would be much larger in scope, including Turkey’s Altay main battle tank, missile defense systems, and perhaps even Turkey’s Kaan fighter jet, which passed its first test flight last year but still is far from operational readiness.

The Turkish-Saudi arms deal would be the capstone to Turkey’s prior advances in arms sales to the Arab monarchies, outside its strategic partnership with Qatar. One year ago, Aselan opened an office in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which had been a staunch geopolitical rival to Turkey for much of the previous decade. Signifying the marked turn around in relations between Ankara and Abu Dhabi, Aselan signed a cooperation agreement with the UAE defense firm Calidus. In the western end of the MENA region, Morocco has been increasing its arm purchases from Turkey, with Rabat having ordered 200 Cobra II armored vehicles from the Turkish defense firm Otokar in 2024.  In early 2025, Morocco took delivery of its first consignment of Baykar’s Bayraktar Akıncı combat drones. Rabat’s 2024 purchase of these sophisticated high-altitude, long endurance drones builds upon its 2021 purchase of 13 Bayraktar TB2 drones from the company. Morocco’s arms purchases represent an important geopolitical nod toward Ankara, given Turkey’s relationship with Morocco’s neighbor and bitter regional rival Algeria.

IMPLICATIONS: Despite Turkey’s impressive expansion of its arms exports to previously more estranged Arab monarchies, the sales also indicate the limits of Turkey’s appeal and the power of competing arms exporting countries to provide a compelling alternative.  Morocco is a case in point.  While Baykar established a subsidiary in Morocco to provide maintenance and spare part services for its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the scale of the company’s investment shows no indication of joint Turkish-Moroccan co-production or co-development.  In contrast, Morocco has developed a deep and multi-variegated arms purchasing relationship with Israel including co-production.

Even before the December 2020 renormalization of relations between the two countries, Israel was Morocco’s third largest arms supplier, covering 11% of its military needs.  The relationship has expanded considerably since, with Israel’s BlueBird Aero Systems announcing in 2024 that it had established a production plant in Morocco. Israel’s second largest defense firm by revenue, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) holds a 50% share in BlueBird, which supplies a variety of UAV systems to Morocco including the SpyX loitering munition and the vertical take-off and landing WonderB and ThunderB systems.  In 2022, Morocco bought IAI’s MX air defense system for about half a billion dollars.

Israel’s three defense firms in the SIPRI rankings each placed in the top 50, far above their Turkish counterparts. Israel’s Elbit achieving the 27^th spot while IAI and Rafael ranked 32^nd and 44^th respectively. Morocco has turned to Israel as an alternative to France, reportedly ordering 36 of Elbit’s Atmos 2000 self-propelled artillery systems in February 2025 to replace the French-made Caesar artillery systems after the French systems experienced technical failures.  Similarly in 2024, Morocco purchased two Ofek 13 surveillances satellites to replace the two satellites developed for Morocco by Airbus Defense and Space France and Thales Alenia Space France.  In terms of drones, the Moroccan military already uses Elbit’s Hermes UAVs as well as IAI’s Heron UAVs and Harop loitering munitions.

Israel is not the only weapons exporter that is keeping the Turkish defense industry looking over its shoulder.  Israel’s strategic partner India has also started production of weapons systems in Morocco.  Tata Advanced System, the weapons manufacturing subsidiary of Indian conglomerate the Tata Group, entered into a 2024 agreement with Morocco to produce its Kestral armored combat vehicle in an industrial zone in the Casablanca area. Tata’s Advanced Systems’ premier product, the Kestral is a WhAP 8X8 (Wheeled Armored Platform) developed in partnership with India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation for optimal for survivability, mobility, and firepower. Tata’s Moroccan factory will have an initial production capacity of 100 combat vehicles per year.  With the Moroccan Armed Forces slated to receive a total of 150 Kestrals over time, while the remainder of the infantry fighting vehicles are slated for export in Africa potentially undercutting Turkey’s armored vehicle sales on the continent.  A rising weapons exporter, India also has three defense firms that have placed in the SIPRI rankings, at 43^rd, 67^th, and 94^th place respectively. If these companies follow Tata Advanced Systems example and position Morocco as India’s gateway to the African arms market, Turkey could lose significant African market share to India. 

Morocco is a bellwether of an expanding trend among the Arab monarchies of the MENA region.  Following the 2020 Abraham Accords that normalized relations between the UAE and Israel, the Emirates’s largest defense firm EDGE came to two agreements in 2021 to jointly develop advanced drone defense systems and unmanned naval vessels for anti-submarine warfare. Elbit similarly established a subsidiary in the UAE in 2021, entering into a 2022 contract to supply the Emirati Air Force with anti-missile and electronic warfare systems. Rafael opened its Abu Dhabi office in 2023, but the company had already established a joint venture with the UAE in 2021 for the co-development of Artificial Intelligence and big data technologies for the civilian market.  Although Emirati-Israeli cooperation in weapons co-development slowed since the October 2023 outbreak of the Gaza War, cooperation continues to expand and points to the durability of the relationship.  In January 2025, EDGE bought a 30% stake in the Israeli defense firm Third Eye, which develops drone detection technology used by the Israel Defense Forces and certain NATO members. At the same time, EDGE invested $12 million in a new, majority EDGE-owned joint venture with Thirdeye Systems to help Thirdeye Systems expand into new markets.  The UAE and India are eyeing the development of a similar relationship.

CONCLUSIONS: The Turkish defense industry’s 2024 record-breaking exports are a testament to the success of Ankara’s 25-year effort to make Turkey into a global player in 21^st century arms manufacturing.  Turkey’s emergence as a significant weapons supplier has also been assisted by the decisive battlefield successes of the Turkish systems deployed in the Syrian and Libyan Civil Wars as well as the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. As an analysis published by Turkey’s SETA Foundation observed, “The program to build up the manufacturing capacities of Turkey’s defense industry developed as a correlate of Turkey’s strategic imperative to function geopolitically as an independent actor.”  With enhanced strategic autonomy, Turkey has expanded its geopolitical footprint in the Middle East and North Africa, becoming a primary actor in Syria and Libya.

At the same time, the expansion of Israeli and Indian weapons sales to the Arab monarchies of the MENA region and especially the advent of co-development and local production in Morocco and the UAE reveals an apprehension about rising Turkish power in the region and a desire among the Arab monarchies to preserve their own autonomy.  With Saudi Arabia yet to establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel, the manner and extent to which Ankara becomes a weapons supplier for Riyadh will shape the future strategic contours of Turkey’s role as a security provider in the MENA region.

AUTHOR BIO: Prof. Michaël Tanchum teaches international relations of the Middle East and North Africa at the University of Navarra, Spain and an associate fellow in the Economics and Energy at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. He is also a Senior Associate Fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Studies (AIES) and an affiliated scholar of the Centre for Strategic Policy Implementation at Başkent Universty in Ankara, Turkey (Başkent-SAM) and the NTU-SBF Centre for African Studies in Singapore. @michaeltanchum

 By Vali Kaleji

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the long-standing Turkish-Iranian rivalry has intensified in the region. Ankara will make the most of the challenges that Iran has suffered in the Middle East, advancing its geopolitical and economic goals and ambitions in the region to the detriment of Iranian interests. Tehran fears that Turkey will now be emboldened to make further headway in the South Caucasus to the detriment of Iranian interests and that it will disseminate Pan-Turkism and incite ethnic unrest and divisions in the Azeri and Kurdish areas in the northwest of Iran. Ultimately though the two countries prefer caution and seek to contain their rivalry. Turkey and Iran have a shared interest in limiting the scope of their rivalry, foreclosing military escalation.

BACKGROUND: Shiite Iran and Sunni Turkey have maintained relations relation without direct military confrontation for nearly 400 years, with their common border unchanged since the signing of the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639.  Notwithstanding, Turkish-Iranian rivalry has been a constant in the Middle East and in the Caucasus. Since 2011 the geopolitical competition between Iran and Turkey has largely played out in Syria, where Ankara supported the rebellion and Tehran the Assad regime. Turkey opposes the agenda of the so-called Axis of Resistance, groups aligned with and/or backed by Iran operating across the Middle East. Ankara’s support for Hamas has been only rhetorical and it has not displayed any sympathy for Hezbollah in Lebanon. On November 21, 2024, after a missile attack targeted a cargo ship in the Red Sea, Ankara sent 6 warships to counter and suppress the Yemeni Houthis, Iran’s proxies. Although “The Astana Process” was launched in 2017 at the initiative of Iran, Russia and Turkey to reduce tensions in Syria, the competition and differences between Iran and Russia with Turkey persisted.</>

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei blamed the United States, Israel and Turkey for the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, after a lightning offensive by Sunni Islamist rebels toppled the regime last year. He said in a public speech that “there should be no doubt that what happened in Syria was plotted in the command rooms of the United States and Israel. We have evidence for this. One of the neighbouring countries of Syria also played a role, but the primary planners are the US and the Zionist regime”. There was no doubt that the neighbouring country that the Iranian leader had in mind was Turkey. Indeed, Iranian analysts largely agreed that the evolving situation in Syria would lead to a new phase of regional competition between Tehran and Ankara.

Turkey has demonstrated that it intends to play a decisive role in shaping the future of Syria and it stands to reap the benefits of the reconstruction of the country. Iran meanwhile, whose overall economic expenditure in Syria is valued at around $20-30 billion, can no longer expect to enjoy any access to Syria. Moreover, the loss of Syria deprives Iran of crucial transit corridors. The creation of the Iran-Iraq-Syria corridor was one of Iran's strategic goals to strengthen its influence in the Middle East region and secure access to the Mediterranean. But with the fall of the Assad regime this transit corridor is no longer viable. Turkey, meanwhile, is seeking implement a 17-billion-dollar “Development Road Project,” which consists of two rail and land routes, in cooperation with Iraq. This transit project could potentially bloc Iran's attempts in transit and transportation in the Persian Gulf, Iraq and the Eastern Mediterranean.

IMPLICATIONS: Iran is also concerned about the revival of the Qatar-Turkey pipeline project with the transfer of Qatar's natural gas through a pipeline that passes through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria to Turkey and brings it to the European market. Although this pipeline faces important challenges – it would notably pass through currently Kurdish-controlled areas in northern Syria where Turkey is yet to assert its authority and secure the disarmament of the PKK affiliated Kurdish militia – its realization can be an alternative not only for the export of Iranian gas to Turkey, but also for the export of Russian gas to Europe. There is no doubt that the revival of the Qatar-Turkey pipeline project would increase Turkey’s bargaining power in the pricing of imported gas from the two competing powers Iran and Russia.

Moreover, Tehran fears that Turkey, after the fall of the Assad regime, will be emboldened to make further headway in the South Caucasus to the detriment of Iranian interests. Specifically, there is a concern in Iran, as well as in Armenia, that Azerbaijan, encouraged and supported by Turkey, will launch an attack on the Syunik province in the south of Armenia in order to realize the Zangezur Corridor and a direct land connection to Nakhichevan.

Iran is strongly opposed to the Zangezur Corridor due to the threat of blockage of the common border with Armenia – without the supervision and control of Armenia – and such an attack, if it were to take place, would obviously have far reaching regional ramifications, further tipping the balance of power in the South Caucasus in favour of the Baku-Ankara axis. A realization of the Zangezur Corridor as a part of the Middle Corridor, parallel to the realization of the “Development Road Project” between Iraq and Turkey, will inevitably reduce Iran's transit advantages in the region. Further, the realization of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, along with the revival of the Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline project represents an important challenge for Iran's gas exports in the region.

Another major, indeed existential concern for Iran is that Turkey may seek to disseminate Pan-Turkism and incite ethnic unrest and divisions in the Azerbaijani and Kurdish areas in the northwest of Iran. Such concerns have been fuelled by the December, 2024 launch of the Persian-language service of Turkey's state television channel (TRT). Tehran is particularly sensitive, not least since the director of the TRT media Mehmet Sobacı on October 14, 2024 said “We are to open the TRT Persian channel at the end of this year. We must disturb Iran; we must disturb Iran!” Although he was subsequently dismissed, the controversial comments sparked debate and was met with strong criticism in Iran. In what looked like a direct response to the Turkish move, the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Peyman Jebeli on January 21, 2025 announced that a Turkish section of Press TV will start broadcasting.

CONCLUSIONS: With the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, Iran has lost a crucial strategic ally in the Middle East and its longstanding regional policy has suffered challenges. Turkey, meanwhile, has gained the strategic upper hand and is advancing its geopolitical and economic goals and ambitions in the region which worries Iran. But the two countries prefer caution and seek to contain their rivalry. This was on display when İbrahim Kalın, the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) on February 8 visited Tehran for discussions with senior Iranian security officials, including Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Akbar Ahmadian and Minister of Intelligence Seyed Esmail Khatib. The discussions focused on Syria, the war in Gaza and on countering the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Daesh (ISIL or ISIS), and other terrorist groups, as well as other shared security threats. This suggests that Iran is aware of the threat to security by the PKK-affiliated Syrian Kurds. For this reason, Iran has welcomed Abdullah Ocalan’s call to disarm and dissolve the PKK. Such a move would have dangerous repercussions in the Kurdistan region of Iraq and possibly also in the Kurdish regions in Iran.

Ankara will try to make the most of the challenges that Iran has suffered in the Middle East. In addition, Turkey feels that it has the advantage in the new round of competition with Iran. But Turkey and Iran nonetheless recognize that they have a shared interest in limiting the scope of their rivalry, foreclosing military escalation.

Vali Kaleji is based in Tehran, Iran, and holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asia and Caucasian Studies.

 By Barçın Yinanç

While the Biden administration preferred to turn a cold shoulder to Turkey and remained largely deaf to Ankara’s messages for improved dialogue, President Donald Trump has always lent an ear to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and been receptive to his arguments. But President Trump will find the framework on points of contention between Washington and Ankara significantly altered after four years. Given his affinity for Erdoğan, and his appreciation of strong leaders, and big countries with big armies, Trump might decide to side with the Turkish president rather than continue to rely on a Kurdish proxy in Syria that the new Syrian government does not tolerate. But with Trump’s well-known unpredictability, a bad start between him and Erdoğan cannot be ruled out.

BACKGROUND: Donald Trump’s second term as president is met with cautious optimism by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his team. Ankara is optimistic because of the relationship that the two leaders built during Trump’s first presidential term. “Erdoğan is somebody I got along with great,” said Trump on December 16, 2024. Later, on January 6, 2025, Trump commented that “President Erdoğan is a friend of mine.” “He is a guy I like, respect. I think he respects me also," Trump quipped. Nonetheless, Ankara is cautious because the personal relationship between Erdoğan and Trump did not prevent the deterioration in U.S.-Turkey ties; on the contrary, decisions that dealt serious blows to bilateral trade and defense cooperation were taken during Trump’s first term.

President Trump will find the framework on points of contention between Washington and Ankara significantly altered after four years. Two issues have essentially poisoned US-Turkish relations: the first is Turkey’s purchase of a Russian-built S-400 air defense system. The second is U.S. support for the People’s Defense Units (YPG), a Syrian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which both Turkey and the U.S. recognize as a terror organization.

On both issues, Erdoğan was initially able to convince Trump about Turkish arguments; yet the latter subsequently succumbed to the pressure from the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon. After two years of pressure on Ankara to abandon the S400s, Turkey was removed in July 2019 from the F-35 joint strike fighter program. Yet a month earlier, in June 2019, Trump appeared to agree with Turkey’s position. As he met Erdoğan on the sidelines of a G20 meeting, Trump said “The president [Erdoğan] was not allowed to buy the Patriot missiles, he wanted to do this, but he wasn't allowed by the Obama administration to buy them until after he made a deal to buy the other missiles. So he buys the other missile and then all of a sudden, they say you can buy our missile. You can't do business that way, it is not good." Trump added that as a NATO ally, Turkey was not treated fairly.

But, on his way out of office, Trump imposed sanctions on Turkey under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), aiming to sanction countries that made a “significant purchase” of defense or intelligence equipment from Russia. This came after a year-long pressure campaign from the U.S. Congress. U.S. lawmakers were also angered by what were seen as aggressive Turkish moves in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean. While Turkey’s military incursions into Syria annoyed both Congress and the Pentagon, this sentiment was not always shared with the same intensity by Trump, who has been critical of never-ending American wars in the Middle East.

During a phone call with Erdoğan in 2018 Trump agreed to move U.S. troops out of northeastern Syria to clear the way for a Turkish military operation to push back the YPG from the Turkish border. Erdoğan made his case to Trump by pointing to the near-total defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the country, and pledging that the Turkish army would fight ISIS. Trump's decision for a full withdrawal though, was never implemented. While 900 soldiers remained in Syria (which was recently declared to be 2000 at present), the U.S. military continued to arm and train the YPG under the Biden administration, a policy that has fueled Turkish mistrust of the United States. But major changes concerning Russia and Syria provide a new framework for the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

IMPLICATIONS: Russia’s war against Ukraine has put an end to further cooperation between Moscow and Ankara in the defense field while highlighting Turkey’s status as a NATO ally. Meanwhile, the fall of Bashar al-Assad has deprived Russia and Iran of a client regime in Syria and strengthened Turkey’s hands against the YPG. As unpredictability remains his favorite diplomatic tool, Trump refused to clarify during the transition period whether he would order a U.S. withdrawal from Syria. But one of the first foreign policy decisions that President Trump might take could concern Syria.

President Erdoğan can be expected to reach out to Trump as soon as possible to convince him that it will be very difficult for the U.S. to continue to use the YPG as a “useful proxy” as Syria’s new rulers have made it clear that they will not tolerate the existence of separate armed militia forces and intend to exercise full territorial control over the whole of the country. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the militia that overthrew Assad, insists that the YPG disband and that it is integrated into the new Syrian army on an individual basis, and not as a separate unit, which the YPG demands.

While Erdoğan would be prepared to guarantee that the Syrian Kurds will not be persecuted and that their rights will be safeguarded, he would also emphasize that the new rulers in Damascus are not open to any compromise that would maintain an autonomous status of any kind for the Kurds. Erdoğan will ask the U.S. to abandon the PKK/YPG once and for all since Ankara has made clear that all non-Syrian members of the YPG – and also PKK/YPG commanders who are Syrian citizens – must leave Syria.

The fall of Assad – who made it possible in the first place for the PKK/YPG to take control over northern and northeastern Syria – has taken place at a time when Ankara has initiated a new attempt to bring an end to the insurgency of the PKK. Erdoğan’s political partner Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has called on the PKK’s imprisoned founding leader Abdullah Öcalan to declare an end to the insurgency, in return for which he could eventually be granted parole. The stance of the U.S., which used to claim its support for the YPG is tactical, transactional and temporary, will be crucial. It is imperative for Turkey to eradicate the PKK’s presence – through its affiliate the YPG – in Syria, where it has been able to establish a mini-state under U.S. protection. Turkey hopes to accomplish this without having to resort to a military intervention. The military option remains on the table, but Ankara wants to avoid it since renewed armed conflict in Syria would risk undermining the attempts to achieve stability in Syria post-Assad and to attract urgently needed foreign financial investments and assistance. Erdoğan will try to convince Trump that the United States can safely withdraw its support for YPG/PKK as Turkey will step in and ensure that ISIS is not resurrected and that the Turkish army, together with the HTS, can take over the control of the prisons and camps where thousands of ISIS members are being kept.

Erdoğan will also seek to reassure Trump that Syria’s new regime will not pose a threat to Israel. Turkey’s staunch criticism of Israel during the war in Gaza risks hampering the dialogue between Erdoğan and Trump, but if the ceasefire that entered into force on January 19 holds, a renewed dialogue between Turkey and Israel could mitigate the risks.

During a press conference last December, Trump appeared to have taken note of the fact that Turkey’s action in Syria has weakened both Iran and Russia. Erdoğan will also try to win Trump’s appreciation by tapping into his dialogue with both Ukraine and Russia. Erdoğan is positioned to play a facilitating role in Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine and this in turn could facilitate finding a solution to the S400 problem.

CONCLUSION: While the Biden administration preferred to turn a cold shoulder to Turkey and remained largely deaf to Ankara’s messages for improved dialogue, Trump has always lent an ear to Turkish President Erdoğan and been receptive to his arguments. In contrast to skeptics among European allies, Trump will find in Turkey an enthusiastic NATO ally that can help facilitate his plan to end the war in Ukraine. Conversely, this could help Erdoğan convince Trump to shift the U.S. policy of supporting the PKK/YPG.

Given his affinity for Erdoğan, and his appreciation of strong leaders who command big armies, Trump might well decide to side with the Turkish president rather than continue to rely on a Kurdish proxy in Syria that the new Syrian government doesn’t tolerate. But as the situation on the Syrian front remains volatile, provocations by third parties as well as by actors on the ground carry the risk of causing early friction between Washington and Ankara. And with Trump’s famous unpredictability, a bad start between him and Erdoğan cannot be ruled out.

Barçın Yinanç is a foreign policy commentator at the Turkish new site t24. 

 By Halil Karaveli

It is by no means certain that Turkey expected, or initially sought, Bashar al-Assad’s fall. Turkey may have decided to unleash the jihadists in the first place in order to exert pressure on Assad. Be that as it may, Turkey’s objectives in Syria are unchanged while their realization remains as uncertain tody as they were before Assad’s fall. If anything, Turkey’s prospects are gloomier. What now looms for Turkey in a disintegrating Syria is a strategic disaster, with the emergence of a Kurdish proto-state backed by the United States and Israel.

BACKGROUND:  When Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an offshoot of al Qaeda that is designated as a terrorist group by the United Nations and the United States, on December 8 ended President Bashar al-Assad’s twenty four year old rule (as well as putting an end to the Arab nationalist Baath Party’s sixty one year old rule) a more than a decade old Turkish goal was belatedly fulfilled.

When Syria’s Sunni majority rose against Assad during the Arab Spring, Turkey – notwithstanding that then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had cultivated a close, personal relation with Bashar al-Assad – appropriated the Sunni cause. Turkey threw its weight behind the Muslim Brotherhood, thwarted American efforts to empower non-Islamist opposition groups, provided crucial sanctuary for Sunni jihadist rebels and exacerbated Syria’s sectarian strife.

Erdoğan and his Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, an Islamist intellectual who had gained prominence as the author of an influential treatise that made the case for Islamist-expansionist Turkish foreign policy, envisioned a Middle East where Muslim Brotherhood regimes would proliferate with Turkish support and provide Turkey with “strategic depth.” “We will continue to be the master, the leader, and the servant of this new Middle East,” Davutoğlu vowed.

But Turkey was disappointed. President Barack Obama resisted Erdoğan’s insistent calls to arm the Sunni rebels and to intervene in Syria together with Turkey. Obama was particularly concerned about genocide against the Alawite minority, the sect to which the Assads belong. Turkey nonetheless remained adamant in its support for the Sunni jihadists who in fact would have succeeded in overthrowing Assad already in 2015-16 had it not been for the indiscriminate bombing campaigns of the Russian air force and for the intervention of the Iranian Republican Guard forces and Hezbollah militias. Now, with Iranian power degraded and Hezbollah devastated by Israel, and Russia exhausted by its war against Ukraine, Assad was defenseless and the geopolitical environment propitious for the Sunni jihadist power-grab.

But Turkey is chastened by what proved to be a disastrous intervention in Syria. Turkey’s sponsorship of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, not only in Syria but also in Egypt, earned it the hostility of leading Sunni conservative Arab powers, chief among them Egypt that in retaliation (after its Muslim Brotherhood president was overthrown in a military coup) partnered with Greece, Cyprus and Israel to block Turkey’s moves in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has since worked hard to regain the trust of the dominant Arab powers of the Middle East.

Meanwhile, Turkey found itself hosting more than five million Syrian refugees whose presence has generated widespread anti-immigrant sentiment and is costing the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) significant electoral support. And the implosion of Syria, for which Turkey bears a heavy responsibility, opened for the establishment of Kurdish self government under the auspices of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the terrorist-designated group that has fought an insurgency against Turkey since 1984.

IMPLICATIONS: The jihadists that overran the Assad regime benefited from Turkey’s indirect support. HTS was protected by the Turkish military in the northwestern Syrian town of Idlib, and it is likely that its emergence out of its sanctuary in late November was approved by Turkey. But Turkey’s proxy is the smaller Syrian National Army that is sidelined by HTS, and there is little reason to assume that the relationship between Ankara and HTS will be smooth. “Syria is too important a country to be left to HTS,” wrote one prominent Turkish pro-AKP political commentator.

Unlike what was the case a decade ago, Turkey’s involvement in Syria is no longer ideologically motivated, and Turkey is eager not to jeopardize its newly restored position as a politically responsible power in the region. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was quick to emphasize the need for a Syrian government that is pluralistic, embracing all ethnic and religious groups. This is in stark contrast to Turkey’s position a decade ago, when it exhibited scant sympathy for the fears of Syria’s Alawite, Christian and Kurdish minorities. While early statements by the jihadists show that their leadership is keenly aware of the need to appear moderate, their avowed conversion to pluralism can hardly be taken at face value. 

It is in fact by no means certain that Turkey expected, or initially sought, Assad’s fall. As late as December 5, when the jihadists took Hama, Turkey’s National Security Council called on Assad to “come to an agreement with the legitimate opposition.” Indeed, Turkey had recently been exploring an accommodation with Assad, trying to induce him to accept a return of refugees. Assad however made clear that he would not contemplate any deal as long as Turkish troops remained in Syria. Turkey may have decided to unleash the jihadists in the first place in order to exert pressure on him. Be that as it may, Turkey’s objectives in Syria are unchanged while their realization remains as uncertain today as it was before Assad’s fall. 

While refugees have started to return, they will not continue to do so, and the flows may indeed be reversed, if stability and peaceful coexistence among Syria’s different ethnic and religious groups proves elusive and divisions are exacerbated. Indeed, Alawites are now seeking refuge in Lebanon. “From Turkey’s perspective, the new element of risk and peril is a collapse of the Syrian state,” says Sinan Ülgen, a former Turkish diplomat. He points out that “the fragmentation of the political unity of Syria could lead to the emergence of a proto-state of the Kurdish entity, with the likely backing of the U.S. and Israel.” 

Indeed, the Kurds were quick to take advantage of Assad’s fall, expanding their territory to the east and south, even though they were expelled from Manbij to the west of Euphrates by Turkey’s proxy militia, the Syrian National Army. The Kurds, who are estimated to represent between 10 to 15 percent of the population, are now in control of a third of Syria, including most of its oil fields. Importantly, they control the border to Iraq, making them indispensable in preventing Iran from infiltrating Syria with Shiite militias from Iraq and in blunting any future attempts by Iran to once again use Syria as a conduit for arms shipments to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This strategic position makes the Kurds a natural and invaluable ally of Israel.

Israel, which has taken the opportunity since December 8 to obliterate Syria’s military hardware and infrastructure, has a stake in a diminished, crippled Syria. An independent Rojava would not only have the benefit of leaving Syria’s Sunni Arabs in control of little more than a rump state – while the Alawites might also seek to carve out an entity in their coastal heartland. It would also provide Israel with a reliable ally at the strategic junction of Anatolia, Mesopotamia and the Levant. On November 10, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said that the Kurdish people “are our natural ally.” Describing the Kurds as victims of Iranian and Turkish oppression, Saar argued that Israel “must reach out and strengthen our ties with them.”

The Kurds, in turn, sense that this is their moment. In a statement published on October 22, Turkey’s pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party assessed that “the encirclement of Iran in a ring of war has raised the possibility that the Kurdish people will play a decisive role.” On October 14, the pro-PKK daily Yeni Özgür Politika republished an old article by Abdullah Öcalan, in which the PKK leader enjoins the Kurds to enter into an alliance with the United States and Israel against Turkey.

In 2012, when the PKK-affiliated Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) first wrested control of parts of northeastern Syria, Turkish-supported jihadists of Jabhat al-Nusra, the predecessor of HTS, crossed the border from Turkey into Syria to attack the Kurds. Today though, Turkey cannot rely on HTS to check the Kurds. HTS is eager to endear itself to the U.S and Israel, and will not necessarily do Turkey’s bidding. On December 13, Turkey's Foreign Minister Fidan stated that "the elimination of YPG is our strategic objective" and that Turkey expects its "Syrian brethren" to take steps to dismantle YPG, expell its commanders - including those who are Syrian citizens - and restore full territorial control. On December 15, Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler said that liquidation of YPG is Turkey's priority and that it will be achieved sooner or later.  Yet, the fall of Assad has not provided Turkey with any new instruments to solve its Kurdish conundrum in Syria. On the contrary, what now looms for Turkey in a disintegrating Syria is a strategic disaster.

CONCLUSIONS:  It was clear months before Assad’s fall that the Turkish state elite had come to increasingly fear the consequences of the war and chaos in the Middle East and in particular that the Kurds were poised to take advantage of Israel’s ascendancy and its degradation of Iran’s power. On October 22, Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the far right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), a key ally of Erdoğan whose party members populate the state bureaucracy and the judiciary, made the stunning proposition that the PKK leader Öcalan should be granted parole if he renounces violence and disbands the organization. Bahçeli praised Ottoman diversity that has otherwise been anathema to Turkish nationalists, and called on the Kurds to join hands with the Turks. On November 17, MHP deputy chairman Yaşar Yıldırım explained that Bahçeli believes that he had to take this initiative to prevent the loss of territory for Turkey.

Bahçeli may not have foreseen that Assad was going to fall when he did, but the strategic imperative that compelled him to offer Öcalan the possibility of parole has now become more apparent. To avoid the looming strategic disaster in Syria, Turkey needs to convince emboldened Kurds in Turkey and Syria that their best bet is an alliance with the Turks. That is a tall order.

Halil Karaveli is a Senior Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center and the Editor of the Turkey Analyst. He is the author of Why Turkey is Authoritarian: From Atatürk to Erdoğan (Pluto Press)

 By Barçın Yinanç

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s claim that Israel poses a threat and might even attack Turkey lacks credibility. On the contrary, Turkish and Israeli strategic interests converge. Turkey and Iran have long been at odds in Syria, Iraq as well as in the south Caucasus and Turkey may welcome the degradation of Iranian power in the Middle East. Yet Ankara must also reckon with the risks of an all-out war between Israel and Iran for Turkish interests. Its military presence in Syria and Iraq exposes Turkey to the risk of being directly affected by the conflagration. Ultimately, the unknown consequences of a wider regional war and its spillover effects could outweigh the benefit for Turkey that a weakened Iran would represent. 

BACKGROUND:  Addressing the opening session of the Turkish parliament on October 1, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu is acting out his dream of a "promised land" for Israel and that the Jewish state harbors designs on Turkish territory. "After Lebanon, the next place on which Israel will set its eyes will be our homeland," Erdoğan asserted. The opposition asked for information that sustains the claim: “If there is a threat from Israel, we would like to know about it,” said Özgür Özel, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). On October 8, the Turkish parliament held a closed session during which the foreign and defense ministers briefed the lawmakers on the security risks that the wars in Gaza and Lebanon represent. Speaking after the closed session, opposition leader Özgür Özel commented that he had not been convinced about the existence of a purported Israeli threat against Turkey. “We did not hear anything that we did not already know,” he said. The conflagration in the Middle East provides Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) with an opportunity to consolidate its constituency and mobilize the public. Conjuring an alleged Israeli threat and calling a closed session of the parliament serves to instill a sense of emergency and insecurity among the population. Yet what ultimately amounts to an attempt to divert attention from the dire state of the economy backfired: the announcement of the government – directly after the closed session of the parliament – that new taxes were going to be imposed to boost the national defense industry caused a public backlash and the proposal had to be withdrawn. Nonetheless, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has continued to raise alarm, warning about the risk not only of a wider regional war but also of a Third World War. Although national security issues and the specter of war are clearly exploited for domestic political purposes, with the government hoping to divert public attention from more immediate economic worries, Ankara nevertheless also remains seriously concerned about the fallouts of the escalating conflict between Israel and Iran.

IMPLICATIONS: Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize the Jewish state, and even though the Palestinian problem historically has been a strain on bilateral relations, Turkish and Israeli national security interests in fact converge. It was only after the peace process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the early 1990s that Turkish-Israeli bilateral ties were significantly developed but public appearances can be misleading: While Turkey is less vocal about Iran – a neighbor with which its geopolitical rivalry dates to the sixteenth century – than it is about Israel, which it pretends is an enemy but with which it shares strategic interests, Turkey and Iran have clashing interests across the Middle East and beyond. Israel appears determined to inflict huge damage to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and by extension to its patron Iran. This strategy may very well be seen as serving Ankara’s interests, at least in the short term. Turkey and Iran have long been at odds in Syria, Iraq as well as in the south Caucasus. In this light, the degradation of Iranian power in the Middle East is in Turkey’s interest. Indeed, when the Islamist uprising started in Syria 2011, the Turkish AKP government sought to topple Syrian leader Bashar Al-Assad, whose regime survived only thanks to the active support of Russia and Iran. Today, Turkish military units as well as Turkish-backed Islamist groups stand pitted against Iran-backed militias in northwestern Syria. Under normal circumstances, Israel’s airstrikes against Hezbollah positions in Syria, as well as its attack on Iran’s consulate in Damascus last April would hardly have displeased Ankara. Yet Ankara must also reckon with the risks that an all-out war between Israel and Iran inevitably would pose for Turkish interests. Ultimately, the unknown consequences of such a war and its spillover effects could outweigh the benefit for Turkey that a weakened Iran would represent.  But domestic political considerations are no less pressing. Erdoğan and his ruling AKP must contend with the widespread popular discontent with the nearly four million Syrian refugees in Turkey; this discontent, which has already cost the AKP votes in recent elections, compels Erdoğan to mend fences with Al-Assad who, however, has been less than willing to accommodate Turkey. The quadrilateral talks between Russia, Iran, Turkey and Syria have been inconclusive as Damascus’ precondition – the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syrian territory – is a nonstarter for Ankara. Ultimately though, Al-Assad may become more open to reconciliation with Erdoğan as Israel’s onslaught demolishes Hezbollah and degrades the Iranian power that he has relied on. Israel’s next step in its clash with Iran could also have implications in Iraq, where Tehran has acquired considerable political clout after the 2003 U.S. invasion empowered the Shiite majority. Turkey views Iran as a destabilizing actor in Iraq and tries to counterbalance its influence. Iran backs one of the Kurdish rival factions, the Kurdistan Patriotic Union (PUK) which retains close ties with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that has waged a now four decades long insurgency against Ankara. As the PKK’s freedom of movement has increased in the area under the PUK control, tensions have intensified between Turkey and Iran. Meanwhile, the relationship between Tehran and Baghdad is far from being a simple agent-proxy arrangement. Last August, Iraq signed a memorandum of understanding on military, security and counter-terrorism cooperation with Turkey, raising Iranian concerns about Ankara’s increasing military influence in Iraq. Turkey has established military bases and posts in northern Iraq, and the rapprochement between Turkey and Iraq attests to Baghdad’s effort to consolidate its relative stability as well as its independence from Tehran. Also economic schemes like the Development Road Project, a proposed trade network that will link Iraq to Turkey serves this purpose. For its part, Ankara wants to use the project as an incentive to secure Baghdad’s cooperation against the PKK while the Iranian-backed PUK has expressed its opposition to the Development Road Project, questioning its benefits for the Kurdish region of Iraq. But as Iran is preoccupied with Israel’s offensive, its ability to maneuver in Iraq may become constrained, increasing the capability of the central government in Baghdad to exert power over its territory. In such a scenario, the Iranian-backed Kurdish PUK might be compelled to sever its ties with the PKK. Yet while the degradation of Iranian power would thus translate into gains for Turkey in Iraq, the security situation in Iraq is also of growing concern for Ankara. Although the Iraqi front has remained relatively quiet since October 7, 2023, there are signs that this might be about to change. Iran-backed Iraqi militias have now claimed responsibility for nearly 170 attacks on Israeli targets this past year, of which more than 70 percent took place in September 2024 alone. The escalation may bring about the targeting of U.S. forces that are based mainly in areas under the control of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). U.S. assets in both Syria and Iraq have already been targeted. The spillover to Iraq threatens to disrupt the relative yet fragile stability of the country to the detriment of Turkish interests.

CONCLUSIONS:  President Erdoğan’s claim that Israel poses a threat and might even attack Turkey lacks credibility. It is a transparent attempt by the AKP government to divert public attention from the country’s dire economic situation. In fact, Turkish and Israeli strategic interests converge. Turkey and Iran have long been at odds in Syria, Iraq as well as in the south Caucasus and Turkey may thus welcome the degradation of Iranian power in the Middle East.  Yet Ankara must also reckon with the risks that an all-out war between Israel and Iran would inevitably pose for Turkish interests. With its military presence in Syria and Iraq Turkey is at risk of being affected and possibly even drawn into the conflagration in the Middle East. Ultimately, the unknown consequences of a wider regional war and its spillover effects could outweigh the benefit for Turkey that a weakened Iran would represent. 

Barçın Yinanç is a foreign policy commentator at the Turkish news site t24