by Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 6, no. 2 of the Turkey Analyst)

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s talk of joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and abandoning the pursuit of EU membership cannot be dismissed as loose talk, but neither does it herald a major strategic pivot. The Turkey of Erdoğan will continue to privilege and nurture its relations with the West, above all with the U.S., Erdoğan’s anti-Western prejudices and sentiments notwithstanding. And Erdoğan’s embrace of a club of autocrats should not obscure the fact that a very significant portion of the population of Turkey still endorses the goal of EU membership, and that holds true not least among the voters of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

by Ben Welch (vol. 6, no. 2 of the Turkey Analyst)

Much is made of the grand strategy of the Turkish-Kurdish energy puzzle, particularly by those focused on the geopolitical concept of Turkey as post-Cold War Europe’s energy ‘hub’ – a role which has had increasing prominence since the nascence of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in the early 1990s. However, at the heart of the matter is something more pressing – Turkey’s need to find sustainable and secure energy to perpetuate its decade-long growth-spurt.  This is supported by Ankara’s desire to turn its infrastructure, and Istanbul’s financial markets, into a sophisticated regional energy trading centre.

by Gareth H. Jenkins (vol. 6, no. 1 of the Turkey Analyst)

On January 9, 2013, three female Kurdish nationalist activists affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) were assassinated execution-style in the heart of Paris. They included Sakine Cansız, the doyenne of the Kurdish women’s movement and one of the original founders of the PKK. On December 28, 2012, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had announced the beginning of a new dialogue with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to try to put an end to the PKK’s 28 year-old insurgency. The timing of the Paris killings has meant that they have been interpreted as being linked to the dialogue; with Kurdish nationalists and Turkish government supporters each effectively accusing elements within the other of responsibility. Although both sides have called for the dialogue with Öcalan to continue, many Kurdish nationalists have serious doubts about the Turkish government’s sincerity, suspecting that Erdoğan’s main aim is to weaken and marginalize the PKK rather than address the underlying grievances that fuel its insurgency.