by Gareth Jenkins (vol. 6, no. 9 of the Turkey Analyst)
On May 8, 2013, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) formally began to withdraw its militants from Turkey as part of the peace negotiations between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is likely to wait until the withdrawal is complete – a process that could take several months – before announcing what, if any, concessions he is prepared to make to Kurdish nationalist demands. Managing the resultant uncertainty will be a major challenge, particularly given the diametrically opposed hopes and fears of Kurdish nationalists and Turkish nationalists. Erdoğan’s record suggests that the Kurds have more reason to be skeptical. But, in the short-term, assuaging Turkish nationalist fears could prove to be the greater problem.
by Svante E. Cornell (vol. 6, no. 8 of the Turkey Analyst)
Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hardly hides his ambition to accede to the presidency under a new constitution providing for a presidential system. Yet his ambition for a further concentration of power in his own hands is beginning to generate unlikely counter-forces. Chief among these is the growing coordination among other forces on the Turkish political spectrum – including the CHP, the Fethullah Gülen movement, and president Abdullah Gül. The latter, in particular, is beginning to more vocally distance himself from Erdoğan in both domestic and foreign affairs. While it may be too early to talk of a rupture, Gül is becoming an important counter-balance to Erdoğan.
by Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 6, no. 8 of the Turkey Analyst)
The imperative to secure energy supplies and the prospect of continued economic growth entice the Turkish state to seek a democratic resolution of the country’s ethnic conflict. Turkey remains determined to deepen the economic integration with the self governing, oil-rich Kurdish region in northern Iraq, and that in turn makes it necessary to seek reconciliation with the Kurds of Turkey. But it should not be assumed that the prospect of future gains, in terms of prosperity and power, made possible in part by secured access to Kurdish oil, will defuse the Turkish nationalist backlash that is building up. Coping with a nationalist psychology that does not necessarily heed what is “rational” is going to be a major challenge for Turkey’s peacemakers.
by Gareth H. jenkins (vol. 6, no. 7 of the Turkey Analyst)
On April 4, 2013, Turkey’s notorious Ergenekon trial took another twist when prosecutors accused one of suspects of murdering former President Turgut Özal in 1993, just four months after a judicial review had failed to find any evidence of foul play in Özal’s death. On April 9, 2013, prosecutors launched a judicial investigation against members of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) for “inciting the public to participate in illegal meetings and demonstrations” after they helped organize protests outside the courthouse in Silivri, west of Istanbul, where the Ergenekon hearings are being held. Such developments have reinforced already grave concerns not just about the cases themselves but about prospects for the rule of law in Turkey.
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.
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