By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 4, no. 2 of the Turkey Analyst)

The liberals who were instrumental in legitimating the ascension of the Justice and development party (AKP) are now dramatically revoking their support for the Islamic conservatives. Its erstwhile allies accuse the AKP of seeking to reintroduce a culturally conservative version of the old regime of state tutelage. Yet it is simply beyond the power of the state to impose an ideological straitjacket on Turkey, be it Kemalist or Islamist.

By Richard Weitz (vol. 4, no. 2 of the Turkey Analyst) 

Though not pursuing an overt or perhaps even deliberate policy of balancing Iran, Turkey has managed to overcome years of tense ties with Iraq and emerge as a major force in that country’s political, economic, and cultural life.  Whereas the Shiite members of the new Iraqi government seek to limit the influence of the Persian Gulf monarchies, and non-Shiite leaders want to constrain Iranian influence in their country, neither they nor any other influential Iraqi group oppose Turkey’s growing sway in their country. As it quietly helps to keep Iraq out of Tehran’s orbit and by linking Baghdad to the West, Ankara is set to increase its own regional influence and, potentially, enhance its value as a strategic partner of Western and Persian Gulf governments.

By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 4, no. 1 of the Turkey Analyst) 

The ruling Justice and development party (AKP) seems to have recommitted itself to keeping Turkey a mono-culturally Turkish state. Recent appearances are nonetheless deceptive. The AKP is not ideologically beholden to Turkish nationalism in the old, Kemalist mould. Turkey’s ruling party is nevertheless heir to a state tradition which precludes societal participation and democratic deliberation. The Kurds are expected to remain quiescent and await the state to eventually extend its benevolence, while the Turks are being misled by a nationalist discourse that veils the changes that follow from the state’s Kurdish opening.