In order to ease the concerns of skeptics who fear that the domestic peace process with the Kurds could, over time, undermine Turkey’s territorial integrity and national unity, the Turkish government is compelled to demonstrate that it will not tolerate the presence of a heavily armed Kurdish group in Syria with broad autonomous powers. Turkey, though, has little room for maneuver. Attacking the Syrian Kurdish militia YPG would not only jeopardize its newly improved relations with Washington, but it would deal a fatal blow to Turkey’s domestic peace process. Ethnic reconciliation in Turkey and peace and stability in Syria are inseparable. 
BACKGROUND: On July 29, U.S. Ambassador to Ankara Thomas Barrack posted a message of appreciation for Mazloum Abdi, the Kurdish commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): “Your leadership and the SDF’s perseverant efforts, alongside the Syrian government’s resolute commitment to inclusion under President Sharaa, are pivotal to a stable Syria of one army, one government, one state.” Barrack, who is also the Trump administration’s Syria envoy, has met Abdi several times and was present during talks between him and Damascus’ new rulers as he keeps a close eye on the dialogue between the SDF and the transitional government headed by Ahmet al-Sharaa.
For many years, Turkey refused to use the name SDF, claiming that the United States introduced the name to sugarcoat the People’s Protection Units (YPG) -- an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers´ Party (PKK) -- that makes up the bulk of the SDF. The U.S. decision in 2014 to arm and support the YPG against the Islamic State (IS) was viewed as a hostile act by Ankara. Since 2015, YPG/PKK forces have been repeatedly targeted by Turkey, and Turkish cross-border incursions into Syria have at times risked pitting Turkish forces against the U.S. forces protecting the Kurdish militia.
However, the growing U.S. involvement in Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad has been welcomed by Ankara. Ankara has expressed appreciation for Barrack’s mediation efforts between Damascus and the YPG. “Barrack represents a new approach—one that understands the regional dynamics, strives for neutrality, and believes that American interests lie in winning hearts across the region. We appreciate this as well. It’s the genuine vision we’ve been waiting for years,” said Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.
As a strong backer of Sharaa and his efforts to reunite Syria, Barrack has been on the same page as Ankara, which similarly advocates for a centralized Syrian state. But after a wave of mass killings in July in Sweida, a Druze-majority city, Barrack acknowledged that Syria might need to consider alternatives to a highly centralized state. “Not a federation but something short of that, in which you allow everybody to keep their own integrity, their own culture, their own language, and no threat of Islamism,” he told reporters.
As talks were being launched between Damascus and the YPG, the PKK’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, on February 25, called on the PKK to lay down its arms and dissolve itself. On March 10, President Sharaa and SDF chief Mazloum Abdi signed a landmark agreement to integrate “all civil and military institutions in northeast Syria under the administration of the Syrian state, including border crossings, the airport, and oil and gas fields,” according to a statement by the Syrian Presidency. On July 11, the PKK began to lay down its arms in a symbolic ceremony in northern Iraq, but the March 10 agreement in Syria remained unimplemented. That, in turn, jeopardizes the domestic peace process in Turkey, which is intimately linked to the developments in Syria.
IMPLICATIONS: Critics in the opposition in Turkey claim that the decision of the Turkish state last year to embark on a new peace process with the Kurds was motivated by domestic political concerns. The real purpose, they claim, is to secure the reelection of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdoğan is constitutionally barred from seeking reelection, unless snap elections are called by parliament, or the constitution is revised, for which he needs to mobilize the support of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party in return for concessions on Kurdish rights. On July 6, the PKK’s imprisoned founding leader, Abdullah Öcalan, reportedly told a visiting delegation from the DEM Party that he will not stand in the way of the reelection of Erdoğan.
While securing the reelection of Erdoğan is undoubtedly an important driver of the peace process, the Turkish state also has geopolitical motives for seeking to secure the loyalty of the Kurds that it fears would otherwise be tempted to gravitate toward Israel, the new hegemonic power in the Middle East. Israel has been vocal in its support for Kurdish autonomy in Syria, and Israel’s foreign minister has stated that the Kurds are Israel’s “natural allies against Turkey and Iran.”
In contrast to Turkey’s policy of promoting Syria’s territorial and political unity, Israel favors a fragmented and weak Syria. Turkey suspects that Israel is encouraging unrest within the Druze community, and is also intent on strengthening Kurdish positions, leaving Damascus facing military challenges on multiple fronts. The Syrian minority groups remain distrustful of President Sharaa, who has struggled to control jihadist elements, which have been blamed for atrocities against Alawites and against members of the Druze community, who are supported by Israel.
On August 13, Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan issued a strong warning, urging the SDF to abandon hopes of cooperating with Israel against Damascus and to honor its agreement to integrate with the central government. "The YPG/SDF must stop its policy of playing for time," Fidan told a press conference with his Syrian counterpart al-Shibani in Ankara. "Just because we approach (the process) with good intentions does not mean we don't see your little ruses," Fidan said.
Turkey and Syria signed a memorandum of understanding on military training during the visit of al-Shibani. Turkey will help Syria with the provision of weapons systems and logistical tools, and will also train Syria’s army, according to the statement made by Turkish Defense Ministry officials. Meanwhile, Turkish pro-government outlets have raised the possibility of a military offensive by the Syrian army against the YPG.
There are strong suspicions both at the governmental and societal level in Turkey that—with strong U.S. military backing—the Kurds in Syria will continue to pursue separatist ambitions under the banner of the YPG. While Ankara is pressuring Damascus to resist YPG’s demands for a decentralized system, few in Turkey believe the YPG will abandon the gains it acquired.
On September 2, Pervin Buldan, a member of the delegation from the DEM Party that has been meeting with Abdullah Öcalan on the prison island İmralı south of Istanbul, informed that the founding leader of the PKK had emphasized that “Syria and Rojava is my red line,” making clear -- if anyone had believed otherwise -- that he will not call for the dissolution of the YPG or for the dismantlement of the autonomous structure that has been put in place by the Kurds in northeastern Syria.
“Turkey needs to side with the Kurdish people regarding Rojava and Syria. Turkey has nothing to gain from trying to deprive the Kurds of what they’ve gained, and the Kurds in Turkey will never accept this,” Buldan insisted.
However, in order to ease the concerns of skeptics who fear that the domestic peace process with the Kurds could, over time, undermine Turkey’s territorial integrity and national unity, the Turkish government is compelled to demonstrate that it will not tolerate the presence of a heavily armed Kurdish group in Syria with broad autonomous powers. Turkey, though, has little room for maneuver.
Launching military assaults against the YPG would not only jeopardize Ankara’s newly improved relations with Washington, but it would deal a fatal blow to its domestic peace process. Instead, Ankara might try to entice Sharaa to take military action against the YPG, but that would face U.S. resistance, and Sharaa cannot afford to alienate Washington, on whose political and economic support he critically depends.
CONCLUSION: Representatives of the pro-Kurdish DEM Party are calling for a paradigm shift; one that sees the YPG in Syria not from a security perspective but from a “confidence” perspective. They argue that the Turkish nation should rely on a strong secular force in Syria that has its ethnic kin in Turkey, rather than relying on an Arab Sunni force that harbors Islamist tendencies. They also point out that pursuing peace in Turkey while simultaneously threatening the Kurds in Syria -- as Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan is doing –– defies logic.
Meanwhile, President Erdoğan evokes the supposedly primordial Islamic alliance of Turks, Kurds, and Arabs. History teaches that Turks, Kurds, and Arabs prevail when they are united, and succumb when they are not, Erdoğan claimed. “The victory at Manzikert, the conquest of Jerusalem, the conquest of Istanbul, the defense of Gallipoli, and the War of Independence were all the common wars and victories of Turks, Arabs, Kurds, and of many other Muslim peoples,” he said in a recent speech.
Turkey has come to enjoy good relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq after having resisted the establishment of a Kurdish administrative entity there. That may provide a blueprint for the future relationship between Turkey and Rojava.
Yet the Turkish public remains skeptical that the PKK – although officially dissolved is endowed with a territorial base in Rojava -- has abandoned its nationalist aspirations. The involvement of the United States and Israel in Syria and their backing of Kurdish aspirations validate longstanding Turkish nationalist fears that “Western imperialists” seek the establishment of an independent Kurdistan.
And after having insisted for the past ten years that the Kurdish autonomy in Rojava represents an existential threat to Turkey, the Turkish government must now convince a skeptical public that Turkey’s national security interests in fact call for an entente with the erstwhile enemy.
This is a watershed moment in both Turkey and Syria. The domestic peace process in Turkey and the concurrent attempts to secure peace and stability in Syria are inseparable.
Barçın Yinanç is a foreign policy commentator at the Turkish news site t24.
