Fatih Yaşlı in Birgün writes that the alliance between the supposed “vanguard of secularism” – the military – and political Islam, which historically was motivated by a shared desire to beat the left, has a long pedigree. The military entered into a pragmatic relationship with the political representatives of religion during the Cold War. One example was when the military after the coup in 1971 asked Necmettin Erbakan to return from his exile in Switzerland to found a new Islamist party. Yet for many years, the Islamists accused – not the military as an institution, but its top echelon – of being alien to the national culture and of being westernized. But this relation has now evolved. There is now a military that the Islamists can much easier embrace; the military is no longer viewed as being alien to “national values,” and is seen as the “army of the nation.” The fight against the PKK has deepened the relationship between Islamism and the military. We have now a “militarist Islam” that has appropriated the army and which is supporting the war. And the military has also changed, and is continuing to change, which presents us with an “Islamic militarism.” It is claimed that the lower echelons of the officers’ corps is becoming dominated by religious officers. It is also claimed that there is a similar process ongoing among the higher echelons, albeit less so. The one area that symbolizes the confluence of “militarist Islam” and “Islamic militarism” is the “national defense industry.” The character of the regime and its political economy was expressed in the fact that the president’s new son-in-law hails from one of the important families of this sector, and was underlined by the fact that the chief of the general staff acted wedding witness.  That was a tremendous demonstration of the zeitgeist.

Levent Gültekin in Diken writes that many people that he has met recently all wonder why intellectuals, businessmen, the “reasonable people” of the country don’t come together to lead a societal opposition. There are a couple of reasons for this. The first is the widespread expectation that something is going to happen, which will change the course of the country, and which will lead to the departure of Erdoğan. Many people refrain from sticking out their necks because they assume that Erdoğan is anyway going to run into the wall someday. The second reason is that no really strong and influential class of democratic intellectuals has formed in this country. The third, and the most important reason, is that the opposition is mostly made up of leftists and liberals. The right -- the nationalists-conservatives-Islamists -- is beholden to the government. Some think opposing it would only serve the interests of the PKK, others see it as damaging the “government of the pious.” Thus, the mission to bring life to societal opposition mostly falls on leftist and liberal intellectuals. But the left is itself torn apart by long-standing divisions.

Ali Bayramoğlu in Yeni Şafak writes that the social fabric of Turkey is brittle. It is as if the Ottoman “millet” system, in which different groups lived side by side, but without contact with each other, persists. This social reality informs our political life. What imports for every separate group is to promote its own interests. When this is the case, “interests” matter more than “principles.” The partisanship in our politics, the natural populism, is the result of this. It is perhaps no wonder that certain state institutions and actors and certain strains in politics and some people often emphasize that the country faces the risk of falling apart. This is maybe an expression of the fact that their respective hold is tenuous, a recognition of the need to hold on, lest everything be lost.  Are we going to continue like this, in the same way that we have been doing now for almost a century? Or are we going to engage in an endeavor to build bridges, make connections, across the different sections, fraternities and groups – many of which have been formed on the basis of cultural differences – embarking on a “great, civilian, egalitarian civilization project?” That is the one truly fundamental question that Turkey faces.

By Gareth H. Jenkins

June 24, 2016

There is currently no clear indication as to when President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will leave power but Turkey is now deep into the final – and highly turbulent – stage of his domination of the country’s politics. Even though some features have remained unchanged, Erdoğan has undoubtedly left a lasting impression on both the Turkish state and Turkish society. The fear now is that, as he descends deeper into authoritarianism, Erdoğan will also cause severe damage not only to the social fabric but to what has always been an incipient rather than an established democracy.

Mehmet Altan in Özgür Düşünce writes that the traditional rivalry between the mosque and the barracks has given way to a coalition, and that there are those who fear that Turkey is headed toward a “Baathist” regime, in which the military and security apparatus controls the economy.  With the exponential growth of the defense industry, some suggest that the military has come to enjoy unprecedented access to financial resources… Will the mosque-barracks alliance then last? Will the rapid increase of wealth in military ranks lead the military to change the position (toward the mosque) that it has had since the beginning of the 19^th century? It’s doubtful. It appears that political Islamist fascism has become so desperate that it has had to cling to its historical rival. This inevitably increases the power of the military. It looks as if the military, which briefly appeared to have lost its traditional sovereignty, wants its old power back, now that democracy has been abandoned. The question is if the military after a while is going to want to hold all the reins in its hands and return us to an even harsher period of “tutelage?”