By Barçın Yinanç
While the Biden administration preferred to turn a cold shoulder to Turkey and remained largely deaf to Ankara’s messages for improved dialogue, President Donald Trump has always lent an ear to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and been receptive to his arguments. But President Trump will find the framework on points of contention between Washington and Ankara significantly altered after four years. Given his affinity for Erdoğan, and his appreciation of strong leaders, and big countries with big armies, Trump might decide to side with the Turkish president rather than continue to rely on a Kurdish proxy in Syria that the new Syrian government does not tolerate. But with Trump’s well-known unpredictability, a bad start between him and Erdoğan cannot be ruled out.
BACKGROUND: Donald Trump’s second term as president is met with cautious optimism by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his team. Ankara is optimistic because of the relationship that the two leaders built during Trump’s first presidential term. “Erdoğan is somebody I got along with great,” said Trump on December 16, 2024. Later, on January 6, 2025, Trump commented that “President Erdoğan is a friend of mine.” “He is a guy I like, respect. I think he respects me also," Trump quipped. Nonetheless, Ankara is cautious because the personal relationship between Erdoğan and Trump did not prevent the deterioration in U.S.-Turkey ties; on the contrary, decisions that dealt serious blows to bilateral trade and defense cooperation were taken during Trump’s first term.
President Trump will find the framework on points of contention between Washington and Ankara significantly altered after four years. Two issues have essentially poisoned US-Turkish relations: the first is Turkey’s purchase of a Russian-built S-400 air defense system. The second is U.S. support for the People’s Defense Units (YPG), a Syrian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which both Turkey and the U.S. recognize as a terror organization.
On both issues, Erdoğan was initially able to convince Trump about Turkish arguments; yet the latter subsequently succumbed to the pressure from the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon. After two years of pressure on Ankara to abandon the S400s, Turkey was removed in July 2019 from the F-35 joint strike fighter program. Yet a month earlier, in June 2019, Trump appeared to agree with Turkey’s position. As he met Erdoğan on the sidelines of a G20 meeting, Trump said “The president [Erdoğan] was not allowed to buy the Patriot missiles, he wanted to do this, but he wasn't allowed by the Obama administration to buy them until after he made a deal to buy the other missiles. So he buys the other missile and then all of a sudden, they say you can buy our missile. You can't do business that way, it is not good." Trump added that as a NATO ally, Turkey was not treated fairly.
But, on his way out of office, Trump imposed sanctions on Turkey under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), aiming to sanction countries that made a “significant purchase” of defense or intelligence equipment from Russia. This came after a year-long pressure campaign from the U.S. Congress. U.S. lawmakers were also angered by what were seen as aggressive Turkish moves in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean. While Turkey’s military incursions into Syria annoyed both Congress and the Pentagon, this sentiment was not always shared with the same intensity by Trump, who has been critical of never-ending American wars in the Middle East.
During a phone call with Erdoğan in 2018 Trump agreed to move U.S. troops out of northeastern Syria to clear the way for a Turkish military operation to push back the YPG from the Turkish border. Erdoğan made his case to Trump by pointing to the near-total defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the country, and pledging that the Turkish army would fight ISIS. Trump's decision for a full withdrawal though, was never implemented. While 900 soldiers remained in Syria (which was recently declared to be 2000 at present), the U.S. military continued to arm and train the YPG under the Biden administration, a policy that has fueled Turkish mistrust of the United States. But major changes concerning Russia and Syria provide a new framework for the U.S.-Turkey relationship.
IMPLICATIONS: Russia’s war against Ukraine has put an end to further cooperation between Moscow and Ankara in the defense field while highlighting Turkey’s status as a NATO ally. Meanwhile, the fall of Bashar al-Assad has deprived Russia and Iran of a client regime in Syria and strengthened Turkey’s hands against the YPG. As unpredictability remains his favorite diplomatic tool, Trump refused to clarify during the transition period whether he would order a U.S. withdrawal from Syria. But one of the first foreign policy decisions that President Trump might take could concern Syria.
President Erdoğan can be expected to reach out to Trump as soon as possible to convince him that it will be very difficult for the U.S. to continue to use the YPG as a “useful proxy” as Syria’s new rulers have made it clear that they will not tolerate the existence of separate armed militia forces and intend to exercise full territorial control over the whole of the country. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the militia that overthrew Assad, insists that the YPG disband and that it is integrated into the new Syrian army on an individual basis, and not as a separate unit, which the YPG demands.
While Erdoğan would be prepared to guarantee that the Syrian Kurds will not be persecuted and that their rights will be safeguarded, he would also emphasize that the new rulers in Damascus are not open to any compromise that would maintain an autonomous status of any kind for the Kurds. Erdoğan will ask the U.S. to abandon the PKK/YPG once and for all since Ankara has made clear that all non-Syrian members of the YPG – and also PKK/YPG commanders who are Syrian citizens – must leave Syria.
The fall of Assad – who made it possible in the first place for the PKK/YPG to take control over northern and northeastern Syria – has taken place at a time when Ankara has initiated a new attempt to bring an end to the insurgency of the PKK. Erdoğan’s political partner Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has called on the PKK’s imprisoned founding leader Abdullah Öcalan to declare an end to the insurgency, in return for which he could eventually be granted parole. The stance of the U.S., which used to claim its support for the YPG is tactical, transactional and temporary, will be crucial. It is imperative for Turkey to eradicate the PKK’s presence – through its affiliate the YPG – in Syria, where it has been able to establish a mini-state under U.S. protection. Turkey hopes to accomplish this without having to resort to a military intervention. The military option remains on the table, but Ankara wants to avoid it since renewed armed conflict in Syria would risk undermining the attempts to achieve stability in Syria post-Assad and to attract urgently needed foreign financial investments and assistance. Erdoğan will try to convince Trump that the United States can safely withdraw its support for YPG/PKK as Turkey will step in and ensure that ISIS is not resurrected and that the Turkish army, together with the HTS, can take over the control of the prisons and camps where thousands of ISIS members are being kept.
Erdoğan will also seek to reassure Trump that Syria’s new regime will not pose a threat to Israel. Turkey’s staunch criticism of Israel during the war in Gaza risks hampering the dialogue between Erdoğan and Trump, but if the ceasefire that entered into force on January 19 holds, a renewed dialogue between Turkey and Israel could mitigate the risks.
During a press conference last December, Trump appeared to have taken note of the fact that Turkey’s action in Syria has weakened both Iran and Russia. Erdoğan will also try to win Trump’s appreciation by tapping into his dialogue with both Ukraine and Russia. Erdoğan is positioned to play a facilitating role in Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine and this in turn could facilitate finding a solution to the S400 problem.
CONCLUSION: While the Biden administration preferred to turn a cold shoulder to Turkey and remained largely deaf to Ankara’s messages for improved dialogue, Trump has always lent an ear to Turkish President Erdoğan and been receptive to his arguments. In contrast to skeptics among European allies, Trump will find in Turkey an enthusiastic NATO ally that can help facilitate his plan to end the war in Ukraine. Conversely, this could help Erdoğan convince Trump to shift the U.S. policy of supporting the PKK/YPG.
Given his affinity for Erdoğan, and his appreciation of strong leaders who command big armies, Trump might well decide to side with the Turkish president rather than continue to rely on a Kurdish proxy in Syria that the new Syrian government doesn’t tolerate. But as the situation on the Syrian front remains volatile, provocations by third parties as well as by actors on the ground carry the risk of causing early friction between Washington and Ankara. And with Trump’s famous unpredictability, a bad start between him and Erdoğan cannot be ruled out.
Barçın Yinanç is a foreign policy commentator at the Turkish new site t24.
