By Kemal Kaya (vol. 7, no. 6 of the Turkey Analyst)
Turkey’s dependence on Russia in terms of its energy needs, as well as the other, important economic ties impede Turkey from rallying to a Western policy of isolation and stronger economic sanctions toward Russia. Although Turkey has in its official rhetoric joined the international chorus in stating that the Russian takeover is illegal, in practical terms, Ankara’s position is much more ambiguous. Indeed, it can be argued that Turkey has de facto accepted Crimea’s absorption by Russia. Turkey does not have a great stake in Crimea, but fears a possible escalation of tensions in the Black Sea region that lead to the military option being put on the agenda. If that were to happen, Turkey would find it impossible to maintain its current stance of balancing adherence to the Western alliance –in rhetorical terms – and its economic and energy dependence on Russia.
By Gareth Jenkins (vol. 7, no. 5 of the Turkey Analyst)
Recent amendments to the Turkish Criminal Code have resulted in the provisional release of more than 30 of the defendants in the notorious Ergenekon court case. In the new political climate created by the power struggle between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the followers of the exiled Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, those released appear unlikely to have to return to prison. Nevertheless, even if they eventually all collapse, the repercussions of Ergenekon and the other politically motivated cases spawned by the Gülen Movement are likely to haunt Turkey for years to come.
By Jonathan Schanzer (vol. 7, no. 5 of the Turkey Analyst)
The corruption scandal in Turkey has pulled back a curtain, revealing the country’s ties to the shadowy world of terrorism finance. If left unchecked, this NATO ally risks being blacklisted by the international community for its illicit activities. The Obama Administration has expressed mild concern about the scandal and the government’s response, but it is disinclined to step into the middle of what appears to be a domestic spat between two political rivals. This is the wrong time to step back, however. Troubling questions linger about Ankara’s relationship with Iranian gold traders, Hamas leaders, al Qaeda in Syria, and persons designated under the U.S. sanctions regime. Turkey’s open ties to these actors are a direct challenge to the U.S.-led sanctions infrastructure, and they raise troubling questions about Turkey’s commitment to its alliance with the West.
By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 7, no. 4 of the Turkey Analyst)
Authoritarianism has remained a permanent feature of the Turkish polity since the founding of the republic. Authoritarian rulers who have gone too far in their abuse of power are showed the door by the electorate, but the structure from which authoritarian power emanates – an all-powerful state – remains intact. The civil war that rages among the ruling Islamic conservatives bolsters the power of the Turkish Leviathan, by demonstrating what can be achieved with “big brother” methods. In the poisonous atmosphere of mistrust and enmity that prevails in Turkey, people are not going to be predisposed to put faith in the notion of a state that is neutral and in everyone’s service; it is more likely that the eternal struggle to capture the state and deploy it to enforce parochial group interests is going to continue, sustaining authoritarianism.
The Turkey Analyst is a publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center, designed to bring authoritative analysis and news on the rapidly developing domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey. It includes topical analysis, as well as a summary of the Turkish media debate.
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