By M. K. Kaya (vol. 2, no. 9 of the Turkey Analyst)

On May 1, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the first, major cabinet reshuffle since the AKP came to power in 2002. While eight ministers were left out of the new cabinet, nine new ministers were appointed, and one minister was given new responsibilities. The comprehensive cabinet revision signals that the Justice and Development Party’s leadership is above all intent on reasserting the party’s conservative core in order to revive the party’s fortunes. However, the neglect of other political currents could eventually prove to be costly for the AKP.

By Halil M. Karaveli (vol. 2, no. 9 of the Turkey Analyst)

The social and cultural divisions of Turkish society often seem impossible to reconcile. The divisions will certainly not disappear any time soon, but ultimately a societal understanding will have to be reached about respecting differences within a liberal, democratic framework. Unfortunately, neither secularists nor Islamic conservatives are prone to privileging a liberal order. However, Turkey’s liberal intellectuals are influential, and could play a pivotal role if they assume the challenge of confronting Islamic conservatism as well as Kemalism.

By Soner Çağaptay (vol. 2, no. 8 of the Turkey Analyst) 

Under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey has cultivated close ties with Iran, Syria, Sudan, the Gulf Countries, as well as with Russia. In the West, the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy had until recently generally been interpreted as neo-Ottomanist, i.e., a benevolent attempt by Turkey to assert itself in the Ottoman realm, which was assumed to be to the benefit of the Euro-Atlantic community as well. However, a closer look reveals that Turkey is asserting itself exclusively in the Muslim Middle East, while ignoring other areas of the Ottoman realm. What is more, under the AKP, Turkish foreign policy empathizes increasingly not with the West, but with Russia and Iran, and especially with Arab Islamist causes.